

Regime Change and Implications on Policy Change and Implementation in Zambia

Musole Siachisa*

PhD, MA, BA, PGDTM, DipEHT Mulungushi University Lecturer and Researcher-Public Administration

***Corresponding Author:** Musole Siachisa, PhD, MA, BA, PGDTM, DipEHT Mulungushi University Lecturer and Researcher-Public Administration

Abstract: This chapter examines public policy and policy change in the context of political transition in Zambia. It covers the period from the First Republic (1964-1972); the Second Republic (1972-1990) and the Third Republic (1990-present) with an emerging era of the Patriotic Front (PF) regime (2011-date). It demonstrates how policy regimes and policy change in Zambia have been grounded on different ideologies that ranged from addressing policy consequences of the racial-hegemony through African Socialism agenda, Humanism, Neo-socialism, and Neo-liberalism to 'Look Far East' policy regimes that have recently responded. Despite these changes and pressures from the citizenry, the state-of-affairs of public policy processes in Zambia and corresponding political changes present a mix-basket of outcomes with both gains and reverses when it comes to the expansion of policy space. Policy development is not only elitist but it is also dominated by donor organizations that have little consideration for Zambia's policy contexts. Thus, public participation is limited as people are reduced to mere recipients of the policies and programmes that are poorly structured and implemented in the country, resulting mostly in policy failure.

Keywords: policy histories; policy environment, political-transition; policy ideas; lobbying; policy regime

1. INTRODUCTION

Policy implementation is influenced by a complex mix of factors (Peter 2000), ranging from political, economic, socio-cultural, administrative, technological to religious factors. Most importantly, studies show that each political transformation facilitates a particular policy framework or regime. In this chapter, I demonstrate this by looking into the relationship between political transition and policy implementation in Zambia. Political transition is understood here as the evolution of governance environments in terms of institutional structures, philosophical shifts, legal landscape, etc. that shape the performance or implementation of different policies or policy frameworks over the years. As regards the Zambian context, this chapter demonstrates how political transitions have influenced policy implementation over the years. The history of public policy-making in Zambia is marred by inconsistencies, policy reversals and a shift from conservatism, for instance, in the 1970s and 1980s to liberalism in the 1990s.

In all these cases, it can be noted that policies were made from the perspectives of the elite. In some cases, the public had to learn about the policies during their launch or through some pronouncements by the ruling party, as was the case in 1968 during the Mulungushi and Matero Declaration by President Kaunda when he announced a programme of nationalization of private-owned companies (Fundanga et al. 1994). This was done within the political context where President Kaunda like most of his peers in the region, for example, President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, considered himself above party politics and minimized political spaces for policy debates and criticisms (Kees 1995). In 1973, President Kaunda declared Zambia a One-Party State where the party (United National Independence Party) was more superior to the Government. The pronouncement was a major turning point as it consolidated exclusionary policy-formulation practices until the 1990s, when, due to economic mal-performance, the government adopted a multi-influencer stakeholder consultative approach to policy formulation and implementation. The stance by President Chiluba in 2000 to try and ignore the constitution and stand for the third term became another contested terrain for citizen participation in policy-making in Zambia resulting in the majority of Zambians rejecting the pronouncement through violent protests.

Observations are made on Kaunda administration and all successive governments that Cabinet appointments are often given to party loyalists who cannot oppose decisions made by one person at State House. Therefore, policy-formulation in Zambia has largely lacked consultation and citizen participation, resulting in little, if any effective implementation. While the pre-independence policy-making process had been predicated on racial selective minority, the post-independence process has tended to be centralized, elitist and exclusionary (Jenkin 1997). This discussion is organized as follows: the next section presents policymaking processes in Zambia from a historical perspective and corresponding policy processes that characterized political transformations (from the colonial era to date). I conclude with policy recommendations for policy practitioner.

2. POLITICAL TRANSITIONS AND POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN ZAMBIA

2.1. Zambia's Pre-independence Era (Colonial regime)

Public policies of the Colonial administration and their implementation were based on the colour-segregation ideology of that time. In 1924, the British South Africa Company (BSAC) transferred its administrative responsibilities in Northern Rhodesia to the Colonial Office, and a Legislative Council was set up that effectively excluded Blacks. The switch from Company to Crown rule exacerbated the plight of the African population because policymaking and implementation were made to maintain the colour-segregation ideology of the BSAC rule. For instance, the first governor, Sir Herbert Stanley, tried to transform Northern Rhodesia into a "white man's country" bridging South Africa and Southern Rhodesia with British East Africa. This encouraged European immigration and set aside blocks of land exclusive to Europeans. By 1930 some 60,000 Africans were forced to move from the lands that had been reserved for white settlers. Even the implementation of social policies in the areas of education and health, followed the formally instituted categories of Europeans, Asians (who came into the country as traders and shop owners), coloured (offsprings of black and white unions) and Africans, in that order of importance. Also, because the economic situation at that time demanded that the African had to provide cheap labour for the mines, the Colonial administration provided Africans with social services such as health and education to have a healthy, literate labour force. Since mining was done in the urban areas, the health and educational services provided were first and foremost to the urban Africans rather than to the rural African population who were in the majority (Simon 1985).

Policy implementation during the Colonial era can be analysed from an economic perspective. The most important development in the early 1920s was the discovery of vast deposits of copper in Northern Rhodesia. The copper industry in Northern Rhodesia's economic development was financially significant. In the 40 years before independence, over 400 million pounds generated in Zambia largely by the copper mines, was exported to the developed world and Southern Rhodesia. In the 10 years before independence alone, the two copper-mining groups, Rhodesia Selection Trust and Anglo-American, sent 260 million pounds in dividends, interest and royalty payments out of the country, while the British treasury collected approximately another 40 million pounds in taxes from Northern Rhodesia and spent only 5 million pounds for development (Simon, 1985). Even when it came to the labour policy, companies organized their labour force based on other British colonies like South Africa. Skilled work was reserved for white workers and semi-skilled and unskilled work for black workers, i.e. the colour bar. High wages were paid to the whites, while African wages were kept at very low levels. By 1945, there were 44,000 Africans and 6,840 whites working on the Copperbelt.

This rapid industrial expansion had profound social and political effects. It reinforced the character of Northern Rhodesia as a vast labour reserve. Most rural areas suffered impoverishment through the absence of able-bodied men in the mines, both within and outside the territory. Similarly, racial conflict sharply increased: for the first time, large numbers of Africans were living and working alongside Europeans in towns within Northern Rhodesia. Africans began to be aware of themselves, not simply as tribesmen, but as an indispensable labour force, as a result for the first time in 1935 Africans briefly went on strike at three mines, though they lacked the organisation for sustained industrial action. The Colonial government would still not allow African unions to be formed, and in the absence of any other effective negotiating machinery, Africans formed "welfare societies" throughout the Copperbelt. It can be argued that the policy framework for implementation was based on the colour-segregation ideology which was discriminatory since all institutions of governance were characterized by white dominance; hence even policies that were formulated and implemented were meant to champion the wellbeing of the whites and not the black people.

2.2. Zambia's Post-independence Era

Zambia's post-independence political and economic milieus experienced three major transformations: The First Republic (1964-1972); the Second Republic (1972-1990) and the Third Republic (1990-present) with an emerging era of the Patriotic Front (PF) regime (2011-date). Each phase has been characterized by a distinctive political ideology and preferred approach to managing national affairs, with implications on policy implementation.

2.3. The First Republic (1964-72)

The implementation of Colonial policies was discriminatory so much that the Colonial regime left a distorted inheritance for Zambia. For instance, the colonial economy was lopsided; in 1964, 47% of GDP was generated by mining while agriculture (commercial and subsistence) accounted for only 11.5% and manufacturing for 6% (Simon 1985). The polarization of mining, manufacturing and commercial farming in the Copperbelt and the line of rail implanted a centre/periphery pattern upon the colony's space economy, i.e. how the economy became manifested regionally or spatially.

Therefore, the new Zambian government faced the momentous task of restructuring the social system to raise the standard of the rural majority. Against so many expectations, Zambians had political emancipation, both from Britain and from the white supremacies. But this was only the beginning of a new struggle for self-reliance and Socialism within a national philosophy of Humanism.

The First Republic was characterised by political pluralism combined with the political dominance of President Kenneth Kaunda and his party, the United National Independence Party (UNIP). Zambianisation was the popular policy in which indigenous Zambians were to take over jobs, industries, and national administrative roles from foreign experts in a bid to provide jobs for ordinary Zambians and empower them. However, most of them were either untrained to fill these vacancies or had no experience whatsoever. It can be mentioned here that some of the appointments to these positions were based on political patronage especially to the ruling party (UNIP) loyalists. Policy and decision-making were highly centralized because there were no divergent views since the President had more powers. As was the case in many newly independent African states, the concentration of executive powers in the presidency also characterized the political process in Zambia. Mulungushi (2003) indicates that President Kaunda was the country's chief policy-maker, he and his closest advisors made all the major and many of the minor policy decisions affecting the course of the country during his administration. This administrative set up led to the failure of most policies after implementation because there was minimal consultation on most policy issues coupled with the challenge of having few qualified manpower to run the administrative machinery and a weak administrative system.

Humanism was the official ideology. Humanism is a set of ideas by which the Zambian rulers explained and justified the ends and means of their policy actions. It was a relatively consistent political belief system that had no unambiguous class basis, and which did not aspire to represent simply concrete particular interests, but rather the general interests of the citizens. Like many other post-colonial populist ideologies, Humanism maintains the fundamental principles of nationalism and socialism in opposition to imperialism and capitalism. The ideology of Humanism is rooted in Kaunda's own Christian beliefs and ideals of mutual respect and cooperation which he saw as characteristic of pre-industrial African society. It can be argued that government policy invariably flowed from Humanistic principles. Tordoff (1980) points out that in so far as Kaunda is himself both the creator of Humanism and the Chief architect of his Government's major policies, Humanism undoubtedly informed Government's major policies and their implementation. For instance, the Humanistic principle of equality led the Government to embark on developing a productive African agricultural sector and improve the rural standard of living. The Kaunda administration also nationalized the mining industry to curb domestic exploitation of the indigenous Zambians. Education and health user fees were abolished in the respective sectors.

The first republic was ended by a decision to bring about a one-party state after a constitutional amendment which came out of political violence and intolerance that was allegedly propagated by the UNIP government to advance the one-party state motion. Kaunda's decision however that a one-party state would be in the country's best interests was not uncommon in Africa around that time.

2.4. The Second Republic (1973-1990)

The Second Republic was born with the emergence of a one-party state in which power was further centralised and concentrated in President Kaunda and the party's central committee such that there were party and government amalgamation popularly known as the PIG (the Party in Government). The president was constitutionally given greater political, economic and social and administrative authority with a lot of vague loopholes which left the president as the most powerful individual in the country with no proper checks and balances to his powers. Saasa (1994: 12) indicates that a "distinctive feature of Zambian politics under Kaunda was the dominance of the UNIP and the high degree with which opposition to government policy was challenged and suppressed". Also, Kees (1995) points out that the opposition to Kaunda became stronger as the economy was going down due to external factors such as falling copper prices. Further, the state assumed greater economic powers by introducing a socialist type of economy in which the state assumed a greater role in the running of the economy with almost every sector being either government-controlled or owned. All the policies were formulated and implemented on socialist principles.

The Zambian Government considered the mining sector so important for its development that the mines were nationalized by the beginning of the 1970s. Zambianisation was the popular policy in which indigenous Zambians were to take over jobs, industries, and national administrative roles from foreign experts to provide jobs for the ordinary Zambians. It can be argued that after Zambianisation, the administrative organisations left behind by the Colonial regime, were run by unqualified administrative functionalities loyal to the Party. Consequently, most of the policies implemented during the period under review did not perform well. Again, the structure of each institution ran parallel to the function of another leading to duplication of responsibilities. In matters of protocol, a party official generally ranked above government official of equivalent function, and that was frequently reflected in how decisions were made.

A feature of Zambian political life was the frequency of government reorganization and ministerial reshuffles. This had a destabilizing effect on the process of government while providing President Kaunda with the power of initiative. The Central Committee was composed of full-time members mainly elected by the National Council with nominations being made after consultation with the President. With the advent of large full-time membership and an increasing attempt by Kaunda to adhere to the state Party policies, the Central Committee had acquired a more detailed role. For instance, in 1978 the President announced a decision effectively to make Ministries (and Ministers) subordinate to the appropriate Member of the Central Committee (MCC).

It was already the case that the Central Committee was effectively the final authority for most important policy issues, with most legislation being approved by a joint Cabinet/Central Committee legislation sub-committee. Moreover, a full-time Central Committee almost inevitably entailed the growth of a Secretariat to service its activities, so that the administrative functions of the Civil Service were duplicated. From these developments, there was hardly a distinction between the party and the government: so much that all decisions were announced in the name of the "Party and its Government." This situation undoubtedly resulted in frustrations on the part of Ministers and Civil Servants, as well as to the politicization of the instrument of policy implementation (Civil Service), a feature which has been prominent in all successive governments in Zambia. Consequently, most policies failed, if at all they were implemented. The UNIP's supremacy over all institutions resulted in more problems because of the inclusion within the Party and Government of a range of political viewpoints that also pulled in different directions leading to confusion regarding policy implementation.

During the period under review, full participation of different interest groups in policy issues was very difficult since the government did not take in criticism and challenge. The only organisation that raised its voice against certain policy issues was the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU). The ZCTU drew its strength from the mineworkers union. Being the largest and strongest union in the country, they used this strength to challenge policy decisions by the government. In 1985, for example, ZCTU challenged the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) measures on the wage freeze; price decontrols; removal of subsidies; and retrenchment. The challenge of ZCTU to Kaunda was a cautious one and not a complete rejection of the SAPs. Thus, the ZCTU supported the move towards privatisation and relaxation of government restrictions on foreign investments (Saasa 1994). Civil society organisation was not fully developed in Zambia at that time except for trade unions in the mining sector.

Other interest groups such as student unions supported the opposition of the trade unions to the SAPs. Such kind of opposition was compounded by the then deteriorating socio-economic performance of the economy. This created a favourable environment for popular opposition to government policies in the context of falling incomes and standard of living in general (see, Saasa 1994). By October 1985, pressure on Kaunda and his government through strikes had increased and consequently, Kaunda announced the abandonment of the SAPs in May 1987. The food riots of 1986, which claimed some lives on the Copperbelt, compounded the situation. Apart from these pressure groups (ZCTU and student unions), Kaunda had also an internal struggle within UNIP to deal with. For example, Kaunda had among his cabinet persons who supported the IMF/World Bank reforms. There was no consensus on the roadmap and the content of the SAPs, as a result, his own Ministers who were not convinced that the programme would work were isolating Kaunda. The question that needs to be answered is; to what extent was Kaunda influenced by the realities of the economy to adopt SAPs despite his socialist inclination and the opposition from interest groups such as the students and the trade unions? From the analysis above, the economic situation was worsening and getting out of hand and Kaunda remained with no meaningful option. Though the interim plan-Growth from own resources plan of 1987 could be described as successful, the World Bank labelled it as a failure to pull Zambia towards their designed economic management programmes and to seek assistance from the international community through the IMF and the World Bank.

It can also be mentioned that trade unions at least succeeded in raising awareness among the people of Zambia to start organized resistance to the Kaunda government and managed to capture the power of the state as evidenced by the government's action to backslide in May 1987 on its policy of restructuring. Though this was a temporary situation, it set the stage for popular revolts against the UNIP government. Apart from the trade unions and students, there are others like the farmers' unions and the business community. Although the farmers were affected by the reforms through restrictions on subsidies, they were not an organized force to bring sufficient pressure on President Kaunda's Government due to constant suppression by the supremacy of the party. The business community, like the farmers' organisations, did not constitute a unified powerful lobby group like mineworkers' union. During the period under review, civil society had not developed in Zambia, there were limitations to access to information and there was no framework to allow all stakeholders to participate in policy issues.

Thus, the private sector remained fragmented and each industrial sub-sector in Zambia tended to plead for its own special needs and requirements and usually bargained with the government independently of other sub-sectors. For example, in the SAPs area of trade policy, there was a strong division among industrialists regarding trade liberalization policy and its likely impact on their operations. Because of this fragmentation, there was no organized resistance to the introduction of SAPs by business people. Such institutions as the Zambia Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ZACCI) in the private sector did not represent a strong lobby against the government, thereby hardly influencing the nature and content of policy development and implementation. President Kaunda monopolized the power structure at the highest level and made his government possess considerable latitude over indigenous (as opposed to external) private interest groups (Mulungushi 2003).

It can therefore be concluded that the period between 1987 and 1989, there was a clear absence of strong institutions of democratic representation, which left President Kaunda to dominate decision-making on national visions and agenda with impunity. Thus, the policies that emerged were usually scantily understood and appreciated by the rest of the country's leadership and citizenry and, as a result, the state usually failed to defend the policy shifts and to implement them successfully (Saasa 1994; Mwanawina and Mulungushi 2003). In general, however, policy development and implementation during the period under review were influenced by poor economic performance, but the detail of the structure and content of the reforms was externally induced and depended largely on the guidance of the external actors. More importantly, external factors, namely, the IMF and the World Bank did not understand the local situation leading to implementation failures. Internally, the political system lacked adequate institutional structures especially in sectors outside mining to influence policy development and implementation. However, the resistance from the mining and student unions set the stage for civil society participation in policy development and implementation.

2.5. The Third Republic (1991 to date)

The third republic can be subdivided into two; the Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) era and the Patriotic Front era. In 1991 the MMD, with Chiluba as its presidential candidate, capitalised on widespread dissatisfaction with the government by emerging as the single most credible alternative contender for the presidential office. President Chiluba's victory marked the end of the Kaunda era and his neo-socialist policies and a shift to neo-capitalist open economic principles that have dominated most of the 1990s and the new millennium years in Zambia.

The MMD government's greatest socio-economic change in its first 10 years of governing was that of transforming the country from a welfare society and socialist type to a liberalised market structure with greater economic freedom and choices. However, the third republic and its SAPs saw cuts in social spending hence liquidation and fall of industries resulting in job loses, cut of agricultural support programs and the collapse of the agricultural sector. SAPs also saw the dilapidation of infrastructure, zero economic growth and mass migrations of public employees to neighbouring countries such as Botswana and Zimbabwe.

During this period, poor policy development and implementation affected the performance of the economy and subsequently increased poverty levels. Considering policy development and implementation, Mwanawina and Mulungushi (2003) contend that since the mid-1990s, the public sector experienced a decline in real pay and conditions of service, which affected its performance, productivity and quality of service delivery. Increasingly, with the erosion of real pay came the depletion of scarce motivational capital because many public servants pursued an exit strategy, leaving government employment or using working hours and public resources to engage in their income-maintenance strategies.

The increasing loss of human capital and other problems have had negative implications on the operation of the public service and policy implementation. Several factors compound the declining quality of service delivery such as the lack of facilities in the public sector, such as computers, office equipment, poor remuneration and lack of training to create capacities in ministries and provinces as well as declining allocations in real term to education, health and other sectors. Further, there was a lack of networking and information flow among the ministries and provinces, compounded by the impact of the Public Service Restructuring Programme (PSRP), which besides reducing numbers, did not offer induction courses to the new staff contributing to poor policy performance in the 1990s.

In retrospect, President Chiluba's Government hurriedly privatized state enterprises in the sectors like the National Agricultural Marketing Board (NAMBOARD). This affected the development of food security resulting in numerous retrenchments of extension staff in the agricultural sector at lower levels under the Public Sector Reform Programme (PSRP). The collapse of extension services witnessed the productivity drop thereby affecting food security and triggering food imports. All policies that were not discussed with stakeholders, particularly civil society and other interest groups such as the farmers' unions affected agriculture growth resulting in lower investments in the sector and total neglect of long-term strategies such as irrigation development and research. This further constrained the expansion of the agricultural sector. Correspondingly, the ability of the sector to provide agricultural credit collapsed after the closure of Lima Bank and other similar organisations. This resulted in many rural farmers going out of production. Further, the land policy, developed in the 1990s, was done without much consultation, consequently, traditional leaders rejected it and acquisition of land remained problematic inhibiting investment in the sector. Investors took up to 5 years to acquire land, further creating an environment for corruption. In the social sectors, there were clear policy contradictions. For instance, the policy of free education did not go with the expansion of classroom blocks and the provision of teachers and facilities like desks and other learning materials. Even though the overall enrolments in basic education marginally increased by 7.2% between 1997 and 2000 (Economic Report 2002), the number of basic schools did not correspondingly increase thereby defeating the objective of providing access to quality education. The result was the mushrooming of low-quality community schools in urban areas. Similarly, the policy on cost-sharing in the health sector reduced access to health facilities thereby endangering vulnerable children and mothers to curable diseases such as measles and malaria.

The Chiluba government was marred with corruption and abuse of office such that it lost public confidence. It can thus be argued that there was great misapplication of resources at the expense of the suffering majority of Zambians. Even when it came to appointments in the civil service for top positions, these were done on patronage basis for supporters of MMD. Mulungushi (2003) argues that President Chiluba gave more autonomy to his Ministers and top civil servants to make decisions whether right or wrong and that the policies and decisions taken on how to implement them were in most cases contradictory.

The successful political transition from a one-party dictatorship back to multi-party democracy in 1991 soon became of concern due to the ruling party's intolerance of the opposition because the opposition was perceived to be an enemy rather than a partner in the governance of the country. The lack of public accountability, unrestrained ethnicity and corruption were some of the major factors constraining effective policy implementation. The privatisation process, for instance, became a conduit for personal wealth among political elites and was marred with massive corruption. Chiluba's 'Vampire State' ended in a situation of economic inducement to people in power and high-level generalized corruption in all sectors of the economy; erosion of political institutions was replaced by close-knit circles of personal loyalties to Chiluba based on ethnicity (Saasa 1985). The most serious shortcoming of the Chiluba administration was the total lack of state capacity to put in place mechanisms to implement programmes and the increasing magnitude and cases of corrupt practices by political elites. Thus, although Cabinet approved several policies and plans, no implementation mechanism was put in place.

From 2001 to 2008, President Mwanawasa and his 'New Deal' administration went more for mixed economic principles as was the case in Kaunda's last years. He believed more in the centre-right while Chiluba was completely on the right. For example, since coming to power in 2001, Mwanawasa pushed forward the idea of subsidies to the agricultural sector and re-introduced the free education system, which was earlier abolished by Chiluba's principles. President Mwanawasa was generally unacceptable to the IMF and the World Bank. He also showed resilience in anti-corruption, reduction of government expenditure and improving fiscal discipline. For instance, President Mwanawasa made Chiluba accountable to charges of corruption he was suspected to have been involved in during his reign.

To accelerate infrastructural development, Mwanawasa adopted a 'Look Far East' policy and signed several bilateral agreements with the Chinese government as a partner in economic development. When it came to the implementation of the privatisation policy, President Mwanawasa was cautious. For instance, he delayed decisions on Zambia National Commercial Bank (ZANACO), Zambia Electricity Supply Corporation (ZESCO) and Zambia Telecommunications Company Limited (ZAMTEL) favouring more consultations, which was one of the reasons that delayed Zambia's qualification to the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) completion point (Mulungushi 2003). Nonetheless, President Mwanawasa continued the politics of appeasement from Chiluba's government. Appointments were based on patronage and ethnicity. This demystified criticisms inside his government on critical policy decisions. Consequently, many analysts argue that, in reality, tenets of a one-party state were slowly coming back as effective opposition was being crushed.

President Banda (2008-2011) did not perform well either, especially, when it came to critical voices on some government decisions. Marred with allegations of corruption and nepotism, he grew more and more unpopular especially with the general dissatisfaction of the people with MMD and the need for political change coupled with many administrative misconducts cited amidst ministers and senior government and MMD officials. The disbandment of the task force on corruption, removal of the abuse of office clause and the eventual acquittal of the second republican president Dr FTJ Chiluba, all that was seen as a direct assault on the late Levy Mwanawasa's legacy of administrative reform and anti-corruption fight. Patronage politics and ethnicity continued under Banda's administration. The privatisation process was still marred with corruption as was the case in the sale of ZAMTEL where some top government officials were allegedly engaged in corrupt practices that made potential buyers withdraw. In all, policy implementation during this time was not effectively done due to economic mismanagement, lack of public accountability, the government's political intolerance and limited political participation by stakeholders.

2.6. The Patriotic Front (PF) Era

The Patriotic Front capitalised on the high unemployment levels, high tax threshold, general dissatisfaction with the MMD government and low-income levels, and that developed a strong campaign under the slogan “More jobs, lower taxes and more money in your pocket”. That approach effectively worked to drive the MMD and Banda out of power in the 2011 presidential and parliamentary elections amidst great political propaganda on both sides. President Sata’s PF manifesto was based on what is referred to as ‘pro-poor policies’. Upon coming into power, the PF attempted many political, economic and administrative reforms including, the dissolving of management Boards of public sector institutions perceived to be corrupt, instituted many commissions of inquiries on various issues of national interests, increasing appointments of women in key decision making positions and massive infrastructure development especially in the road and social sectors.

Following President Sata’s death in 2015, serious reverses took effect under President Lungu. There has been reduced political space in terms of freedom of speech and assembly. Critical voices on government decisions are considered enemies of the state and several opposition party leaders, civil rights activists and journalists have been taken to court or jailed by merely criticizing the government on certain policy issues. Civil servants who are perceived to be sympathisers of the opposition are retired on national interest and appointments in the administrative system are based on patronage and ethnicity. Policy implementation has not been effective as the civil service is characterized by corruption as reported in the Auditor General’s Report of 2019. This is coupled with poor working conditions in the civil service and high cost of living which has brought a lot of frustrations among the workers. There are other reports for instance where top government officials have been cited for engaging in corrupt practices when it comes to awarding contracts especially in the road sector and that has resulted in shoddy works being done by contractors. The majority of Zambians have lost trust in the government as they believe that most of the institutions of governance like the Police, Judiciary, Anti-Corruption Commission, Drug Enforcement Commission and the Electoral Commission of Zambia have considerably been captured by the ruling party.

Economically, the Lungu administration has continued on President Sata’s vision with infrastructure development and promoting a liberal economy. However, policy implementation has been threatened by massive corruption in government circles leading to loss of investor and donor confidence especially in the privatized mines. Zambia is currently in high external debts due to over-borrowing. Coupled with the COVID-19 pandemic, Zambia is currently witnessing a retrogressive turning point with increased unemployment level, high inflation, high cost of living etc., all of which have increased levels of poverty among Zambians.

3. CONCLUSIONS

Zambia has had an amazing political transformation process in four main phases creating different political environments that have similarly had far-reaching effects on policy implementation. The Kaunda era (First and Second Republics) had the main strength of infrastructural development, empowerment and massive social investment but was weak in ensuring sustained economic and institutional management. The poorly planned Zambian nation under a one-party state led to the poor management of the economy whose policies were based on neo-socialist ideology and that led to poor implementation of most policies like privatisation. The Third Republic is characterized by a remarkable political shift from a one-party state to multi-party democracy. There was also a shift in the political ideology from neo-socialism to liberalism. There was the adoption of a mixed market economy and liberal principles which saw the implementation of the privatisation policy. However, policy implementation was not effective because of the lack of a planned implementation mechanism, reversal of democratic gains, imposition of international policy frameworks coupled with gross mismanagement of public resources. In addition, policy formulation in Zambia is largely elitist and public participation in policy issues is limited. People are mere recipients of the policies and programmes being implemented in the country, resulting in most policies not having tangible positive effects on the lives of the people. It can be argued that the poor performance of the Zambian economy in the 1980s, 1990s and beyond was partly a result of an elitist policy development and implementation besides the poor performing public sector. The lesson from this chapter is that policy implementation in Zambia should consider issues of appropriateness, sustainability and impact of public-participation.

REFERENCES

- Abubakar Sambo. 1999. *What is Public Policy?* In Anifowose, Remi and Francis Enemuoh (eds.) Elements of Politics. Lagos: Malthouse Press Ltd.
- Ajular Omoniyi Victor. 2018. *The Challenges of Policy Implementation in Africa and Sustainable Development Goals*. PEOPLE: International Journal of Social Sciences, 3 (3), 1497-1518
- Brynard Peter. 2000. *Multiplicity in Public Implementation*. School of Public Management and Public. University of Pretoria, South Africa.
- Cabinet, 2000. *The Cabinet Handbook*. Lusaka.
- Cloete Fanie and Wissink Henry. 2000. *Improving Public Policy*. Pretoria: Van Schaik Publishers.
- De Leon Peter and De Leon Lester. 2002. *Whatever happened to Policy Implementation? An alternation approach*. Journal of Policy Administration Research and Theory. 12 (4): 467-492.
- Edward George. 1980. *Implementation of Public Policy*. Congressional Quarterly Press, Washington DC.
- Fundanga Caleb. 1994. *Economic Development and Democracy: Critical Issues in the Third Republic*. Economic Association of Zambia. Lusaka.
- Howard Simson. 1985. *Zambia: Country Study*. Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala.
- Kees Van Donge. 1995. *Zambia. Kaunda and Chiluba, Enduring patterns of political culture, democracy and political change in Sub Saharan Africa*, edited by John A. Wisean. New York: Praeger Publishers.
- Mulungushi Shamilimo James. 2007. *Policy Development and Implementation in the Post-Liberalisation era in Zambia (1990 and beyond): Towards a Participatory Planning and Economic Management Model*. (PhD Thesis) University of South Africa.
- Saasa, Oliver. 1994. *Public Policymaking in developing countries: The utility of contemporary decision-making models*. Public Administration and Development, Volume 5(4).

Citation: Musole Siachisa. "Regime Change and Implications on Policy Change and Implementation In Zambia" *International Journal of Political Science (IJPS)*, vol 9, no. 2, 2023, pp. 28-36. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.20431/2454-9452.0902004>.

Copyright: © 2023 Authors. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.