

## Post Qaddafi Libyan Crisis and its North African Neighbours

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**Abstract:** This article on “Post Qaddafi Libyan Crisis and its North African Neighbours” aimed at exploring the 2011 Libyan uprising as it has affected her North African neighbours. It used secondary sources of data collection (books, internet materials, journal articles and monographs), and relied on Rosenau’s Linkage Theory as a tool of its explanation. Findings revealed that weak institutions, militias, Jihadist groups are responsible for the prolongation of the Libyan crisis. The Libyan crisis has led to arms proliferation, drugs and human trafficking, humanitarian crisis, including economic hardship among her North African neighbours (Algerians, Tunisians, Egyptians and Sudanese). Regrettably, United States, United Kingdom, France and Qatar supported United Nations led government in Tripoli, while Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Russia and United Arab Emirate backed factional government in Tobruk. Unarguably, this division has complicated peace process in Libya; hence, the paper recommends general elections, establishment of border guard as well as international cooperation as panacea for Libyan Crisis.

**Keywords:** actors, arms, crisis, drugs, jihadist, linkage, militia, neighbors, proliferation, security, smuggling.

### 1. INTRODUCTION

Geographically, Libya is part of Maghreb region that is located in North Africa. This Arab state is bounded by the Mediterranean Sea to the north, Egypt to the east, Sudan to the southeast, Chad to the south, Niger to the southwest, Algeria to the west and Tunisia to the northeast. Libya has 6.9 million people with a land area that is not less than 700,000 square miles (1.8 million km<sup>2</sup>). It is made up of three historical regions; Tripolitania, Fezzan including Cyrenacia created by Ottoman Empire in 16<sup>th</sup> century (Tinti & Westcott, 2016). Italy invaded Ottoman Empire and liberated Libya in 1911. The Fascist Leader of Italy, Benitto Mussolini ruled over Libya until when he was defeated in 1945, that led to the end of the Second World War and the formation of the United Nations. Again, Libya was a trusteeship territory under the United Nations control, until 1<sup>st</sup> January 1952 when it became an independent state in North Africa (International Crisis Group, 2013).

King Mohammad Idris I was chosen by the foreign power; Britain, France, United States and Russia, including the National Assembly and sworn in as the first leader of the state on 24<sup>th</sup> December 1951. The state was ruled basically on the Islamic Law (Sharia). Regrettably, the king was accused of being silent and non-proactive against Israel, during the Israeli-Palestinian war of 1967. The king was also seen as a western mole against the Arab. King Idris I left the country to United Kingdom for medical reason, and this paved way for coup d’eta on 1<sup>st</sup> September 1969. Late Colonel Muammar al Qaddafi was declared the Head of State (Blanchard, 2020).

On March 1977, Qaddafi declared Libya as a socialist state and fashioned the state foreign policy towards Russia. Qaddafi ignored United States and her allies and promised to liberate Arabs from the West. The relationship between United States and Libya continued deteriorating to the extent that trade restriction and travel ban were imposed on Libyan government officials. On 15<sup>th</sup> April 1986, United States government bombed Tripoli and Benghazi. Qaddafi adopted daughter, Hana Qaddafi was killed and many other people lost their lives. United States defended her action on the ground that Libya produced chemical war materials and sponsored terrorism in the Middle East. On 21<sup>st</sup> December 1988, Libya retaliated. Libyan government sponsored Abu Mohammad, a terrorist, to

embark on activity that led to the explosion of “Pan AM Flight 103, also known as Lockerbie, Scotland” which resulted in the death of 270 passengers, mostly Americans” (Alexander, 2013, p. 3). The relationship between Libya and the west normalized immediately Libya released the perpetrators of the crime to the International Court of Justice at Hague and decided to hand over the contested Aouzou Strip to Chad.

Domestically, Qaddafi’s regime was full of mixed feelings among Libyans. In 1975, Qaddafi unveiled his socialist radicalism as contained in his book “The Little Green Book,” in which he declared that Libya’s wealth belongs to all of its people equally. The state restricted peoples’ right to have private business. The function of the state was centralized and the basic institutions like National Oil Corporation (NOC), Central Bank, Great Man Made River, Libyan General Electric Company, Libyan Post Telecommunications and Information Technology Company were under strict control of the state. However, in line with his socialist principle, Winer (2019) hinted that:

Qaddafi built a rentier socialist society in which...all basic needs (water, electricity, cheap energy and food, health care and education for both sexes) were met by the state... The technocrats stayed out of politics. They were generally competent; their capabilities were enhanced by stints study in any of the world’s best universities, paid for by the state (p.4).

Qaddafi was a dictator, tribalist, and ethnic bigot despite these, his regime was good for poor African states. Tinti and Westcott (2016) recalled that, “between March and August 2013, as many as 8,000 people were leaving Agadez for Libya every month” (p.9). Though most of these people were irregular migrants whose aim was to cross Mediterranean Sea, through Libya to Europe, however, some who could not succeed were gainfully employed in Libya. This is a gesture which no other African state can exhibit. In the same vein, UN Security Council (2012) posited that:

As a result of its oil wealth and infrastructure development and the deliberate policies of Libya’s late leader Muammar al-Qaddafi, Libya became a magnet for many improvised sub-Saharan Africans who fled their countries either as a result of conflict or difficult living conditions and migrated to Libya seeking “greener pastures.” Others were absorbed into Libyan army as regular officers and, reportedly as mercenaries and were allegedly given Libyan citizenship.

Regrettably, Qaddafi did not open political space for popular participation, accommodate opposition voices nor accept civil society agitations. Most of those that occupied sensitive positions in his government were from his ethnic clan; ‘Qadhafha.’ The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) the highest ruling organ decided the fate of the opposition elements. International Crisis Group (2013) hinted that, Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) members that included a representative from the armed forces and the police exercised power over court. The RCC nominated all judges. By the late 1970s, the court had tried over 200 people affiliated with the former monarchy, including former King Idris I, who was sentenced to death in absentia. Winer (2019) also recalled the:

1996 massacre at Abu Salim Prison, in which...1,270 prisoners including...Libya’s best and brightest political activists were slaughtered and buried on the spot, before their bodies were exhumed and then grounded into dust, to leave no trace of what had happened... these influential Libyan families who lost fathers, brothers, sons and cousins never forgave Qaddafi and his regime (p.6).

Expectedly, local Libyans who were looking for opportunity to free themselves from the grip of Qaddafi’s dictatorship had every reason to thank God over the Arab spring. “This revolutionary process began in Tunisia, continued in Egypt, exploded in Libya and then spread to other countries, including Yemen, Syria, Bahrain...” (Alexander, 2013, p.5). In Libya, the non-violent protest started on 15<sup>th</sup> February 2011, following the arrest of a human rights lawyer, Fethi Tarbel who criticized Qaddafi’s government at Benghazi’s Court. Three days later, the protest became violent and engulfed the entire country. National Transitional Council headed by Mustafa Abdul-Jalil was set up in Benghazi, a city in eastern Libya on 27<sup>th</sup> February 2011. Sayf al-Islam, one of the Qaddafi sons addressed the nation on 21<sup>st</sup> February 2011 and warned against the protest; which was instigated by outsiders according to him. Sayf al-Islam vowed that Qaddafi regime would fight “to the last bullet.” On 22<sup>nd</sup> February 2011, the Head of State, Muammar al Qaddafi addressed the people of Libya through state television, condemned the protest, called the protesters traitors and further encouraged his supporters to fight them until they vanish (International Crisis Group 2013). Unfortunately,

Qaddafi was controlling only three cities; Tripoli, Sirte and Sabha, before the broadcast. International Crisis Group (2011) recalled that:

Inspired by the Arab spring and attempting to follow its script, most major cities and towns from east to west including its five largest, rose up...Benghazi and Bayda in the east fell quickly to the rebels, aided by key defections of military and civilian personnel. In the west, however, the regime managed to crush the Tripoli and Zawiyah rebellions, with significant loss of life. It also attempted to crush the Misrata rebellion, but met with stiff resistance, despite a heavy death toll, the city never fell back into government control (p.1).

Again, as the carnage continued across the country, international community became worried and interested. On 11<sup>th</sup> March 2011, the European Union unanimously called the Libyan leader, Qaddafi to step down; France, United Kingdom asked Qaddafi to relinquish power and sought for the United Nations establishment of “no fly zone” over Libyan airspace, in order to protect the rebel and the vulnerable civilian population. However, Germany, United States and China expressed reservation, emphasizing the need for wider consultation. African Union (AU) rejected foreign military intervention in Libya, while Arab League passed a resolution on 13<sup>th</sup> March 2011 calling for the United Nations Security Council to impose a “no fly zone” over Libya (International Crisis Group 2011). The Libyan neighbours Niger, Chad, Algeria, Sudan, Tunisia, Egypt even Mali bore the brunt of the violent protest. UN Security Council (2012) alerted that:

The government of these countries, especially those in the Sahel region had to contend returnees as well as the inflow of unspecified and unquantifiable numbers of arms and ammunition from the Libyan arsenal. Although the volume and impact of the returnee population differs from one country to the other, the influx clearly has the potential to further exacerbate an already precarious and tenuous situation (p.1).

Refugee camps were in Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt. However, United Nations cannot be silent and allowed the crisis to continue unabated, hence on 17<sup>th</sup> March 2011; United Nations Security Council voted and permitted military action as well as “no fly zone” in order to protect Libyan citizens. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) officially decided to implement the Security Council Resolution 1973. United States, United Kingdom and France led the allied forces against the Qaddafi’s regime. The pro-Qaddafi forces that were gaining ground in cities like Misrata and Agdibiya, lost Marsa el Brega, Ras Lanuf, and Ben Jawad, as a result of NATO warplanes bombardments. The rebel forces took advantage of the NATO bombardments and advanced towards the last strongholds of Qaddafi; Bani Wali and Sirte in late September 2011. Since everything that has beginning must surely have an end, Muammar al Qaddafi, the Libyan supreme leader was captured alive and killed on 20<sup>th</sup> October 2011 at Sirte (International Crisis Group, 2011).

However, questions that beg for immediate answers are:

- Which theoretical framework suit post Qaddafi Libyan crisis and its North African neighbours?
- What factors accounted for the prolongation of the post Qaddafi Libyan crisis as it affects its North African neighbours?
- How did post Qaddafi Libyan crisis impact on its North African neighbours?
- What are the responses of the international community to post Qaddafi Libyan crisis and its North African neighbours?

The first part of this article deals with the theoretical framework, while the second section explains factors that contribute to the prolongation of the Libyan crisis. The third section analyses the impacts of Libyan crisis on her North African neighbours while the fourth section explains the responses of the international community to Libyan crisis and its neighbours. The last section is the concluding remarks, follow by the references

## 2. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: JAMES ROSENAU’S LINKAGE THEORY

Rosenau (1969) described the term “linkage” as “any recurrent sequence of behavior that originates in one system and is reacted to, in another” (p.5).” Indeed, like system theory, linkage theory attempts to establish the relationship or inter-connectivity between the domestic politics and foreign policy. It

emphasizes the fact that both national and international politics co-exist together in a single system (Johari, 2012). Smith (2003) explained further that, the theory of system conveys the interrelationship between the parts of a polity so that when there is a change in one part, other parts will be affected. This confirms Mingst's (2000) assertion that, "system is an assemblage of units, objects or parts united by some forms of regular interaction." (p. 204)

In the light of these arguments, Rosenau's linkage theory however is a projection of the interdependence and interaction that exist in the Estonian political system. It establishes the fact that system could only survive in an environment where there is an input and output.

Johari (2012) opined further that, "the initial and the terminal stages of "linkage" are described as "inputs" and "output" and differentiated according to their origin within the state or within the existing environment" (p.158). According to Dougherty and Pfaltgraff (1979) there is an agreement among scholars in the field of International Relations that the domestic forces within the national political units exert a major effect on the international system. These domestic forces are the "inputs" while the responses by the international community are the "outputs." The inextricable relationship between the input and the output is what Rosenau (1969) called linkage.

Rosenau (1969) also posited that, there are three forms of linkage; namely, the penetrative, reactive as well as emulative linkage. Penetrative linkage is a form of linkage in which one polity (state) serves as a participant in the political process of another, and shares the authority to allocate values within the penetrated unit. Johari (2011) equally said that, Rosenau's penetrative linkage embraces not only political and military but also economic and could be usefully employed to analyze industries and economies dominated by massive foreign investments. Furthermore, reactive linkage is concerned with a linkage that is caused by the boundary-crossing reaction without direct foreign participation in the decision made within the unit. Johari (2011) highlighted further that, even though "those responsible for the input do not penetrate the other unit but nevertheless those responsible for the outputs with the unit do react" (p.158). In addition, emulative linkage focuses on the demonstration effect, especially in a situation whereby political activities in one country are perceived and emulated by another. Indeed, linkage is "emulative" when a state copies the initiating state without any expectation of "matching" (Johari, 2011).

Lastly, Rosenau also postulated "adaptive behavior as an important offshoot of the linkage theory." The adaptive behavior highlights the fact that, "nations can be viewed as adapting entities with similar problems that arise out of the need to cope with the environment" (Johari, 2011). In conclusion, nations seek understanding not in unique factor, but in common factor according to Rosenau (1969). The dynamics surrounding the Libyan crisis, especially, misrule, oppression, poverty, marginalization and above all non-inclusiveness constituted the main input that triggered the non-state actors; militias and the Islamist groups, to take up arms against late Qaddafi and his government. The output refers to the deaths, destructions of public and private properties, mass refugees, including humanitarian crisis caused by the conflict, thereby attracting foreign intervention. Libya became the environment where the state and the non-state actors as well as international players co-exist. In Rosenau's (1969) assumption, there are four major concepts that served as the building blocks of the linkage theory; penetrative, reactive, emulative and adaptive. The penetrative linkage in which a state participates in the political process of another state, and has authority to allocate values within the penetrated state, could be explained within the context of the role of the international players in Libyan crisis. The UN Security Council Resolution 1973, which was passed on 17<sup>th</sup> March 2011, served as a turning point in Libyan crisis.

International actors became interested in Libyan crisis. The United Kingdom; France, Britain and United States used NATO platform to bombard Libya and further strengthened the anti-Qaddafi groups; while Russia and China preferred non-interference as the lasting solution to the crisis (International Crisis Group, 2011). Regrettably, immediately after the death of Qaddafi in 2011, internal struggle for power resumed. General Haftar refused to recognize the General National Council (GNC) headed by Prime Minister Sarraj, but formed a Libyan National Army (LNA). The House of Representative Speaker, Aguila also refused to recognize the leadership of the Prime Minister Sarraj; but chosed Tobruk instead of Tripoli as his capital. In the light of this confusion, international players became divided between the two camps, even though Prime Minister Sarraj's position had United Nations backing. Indeed, based on the ideological and geographical ties, Egypt,



Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirate, and Russia sided Tobruk government. By contrast, Turkey, Qatar, France, United States, United Kingdom continued supporting the United Nations backed government in Tripoli. Winer (2019) decried that:

The competition between forces backed by Qatar and Turkey on the one hand and by Egypt, United Arab Emirate, Jordan and Saudi Arabia (and later Russia) on the other hand, played a substantial role in the ultimate splitting of the country into two governments in June 2014 neither of which controlled much territory, outside their respective capitals of Tripoli in the west and Tobruk in the east (p.10).

It should be recalled that, on 23<sup>rd</sup> June, 2020, the Egyptian President, Abdel Fattah El Sisi visited Sidi Barrani Awbase and informed his airforce and other security personnel that, they should be prepared for any mission within its borders or if necessary outside its borders. Blanchard (2020) hinted further that, “he added...any direct intervention by Egypt now has international legitimacy, whether under the UN Charter on self-defense...Sisi specifically identified the central Libyan city of Sirte or Al Jutra as tripwire, saying...this for us a red line” (p.8).

Rosenau’s reactive linkage emphasized on the boundary-crossing reaction from the neighbouring states. The Libyan crisis affected the neighbouring states more than the European nations and members of NATO in particular. Blunhard (2020) posited that:

Libya’s immediate neighbours have been most directly affected by the unrest and persistent insecurity in the country. Foreign fighters from Chad, Sudan, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Niger and Mali have travelled to Libya to support various armed groups overtime, including factions aligned with GNA, LNA, Islamic State and Al Qaeda. Libya based islamist extremists and criminal organizations have created security challenges and had been linked to attacks in...these countries since 2011 (p.18).

In 2017, Egypt attempted to broker peace in Libya. Egyptian government invited the leader of the United Nations backed government in Tripoli, Prime Minister Sarraj and the leader of Libyan National Army; General Haftar of Tobruk for a talk in Cairo, regrettably, the result of the meeting was not fruitful. According to Shifteraid (2019), “Egypt not only hoped it could mediate a favourable outcome for Haftar,...successfully reunifying the armed forces would prompt United Nations to lift its ban on weapons exports to the Libyan army, which Egypt blames for stalling Haftar’s progress” (p.18). Again, President el Sisi convened African Union Troika Summit on Libya in 2019. The Summit was attended by Denis Sassou Nguesso, the President of the Republic of Congo, and Chairperson of the High-Level Committee on Libya. Paul Kagame, the President of Rwanda, and former Chairperson of African Union in 2018, Cyril Ramaphosa, the President of South Africa, the former Chairperson of Africa Union in 2020, including Moussa Faki, Chairperson of the African Union Commission.

Regrettably, nothing good came out of the meeting. Algerian government has also reacted decisively to the threats that come from the Libyan borders. Lounnas (2018) recorded that, Algeria deployed more than 35,000 soldiers including other security services to the Libyan borders. It also mounted surveillance aircraft and used helicopters to hover around the border with Libya. “Algeria has launched 5 satellites in the past few years which allow the security services to have a satellite coverage of the territory and increase the control of the border” (Lounnas, 2018, p.16). Apart from the military approach, Algeria has been partnering with the United Nations in all the processes that could bring peace to Libya. It should be recalled that in February 2015, Algeria supported UN Security Council against Egypt’s call for partial lifting of arms embargo on Libya. “It sees the Egyptian approach as driven by hostility to political Islam, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood” (International Crisis Group, 2015, p.16). International Crisis Group (2015) further maintained that:

It has worked closely with the UN Special Representative and Head of the UN Support Mission in Libya, Bernardino Leon, hosting the political parties track of the United Nations led negotiations. It views facilitating a political solution to the crisis and the re-emergence of state institutions not only as a priority in itself, but also as a foremost consideration for fighting the spread of violent jihadism. (p.15).

The reaction from Tunisia was prompt. The Tunisian government collaborated with international community, especially France and United States including Algeria to declared a state of emergency and decided to close its border with Libya, after building a protective wall. Lounnas (2018) also

maintained that, “government collaborated with the internationally recognized Government of National Accord in Tripoli, as well as the Libyan tribes living close to the borders and local Libyan militias to secure the area” (p.13). It should be recalled that in August 2013, Zeidan, the Prime Minister of Tunisia met with Libyan Foreign Minister in Tripoli and discussed extensively on border controls, smuggling of goods, as well as strengthening bilateral cooperation over counter terrorism (Mzioudet, 2013). Similarly, Sudan has been supporting the Tripoli led government of Prime Minister Sarraji. Sudan was against Qaddafi because of his support for the rebel groups; Justice and Equity Movement (JEM) including Darfur rebel under the leadership of Khalil Ibrahim. Therefore, the fall of Qaddafi’s government was a blessing for Sudan. Presently, there is a relative peace in Sudan. It should be recalled that in 2012, the former Sudanese President Bashir, had said that, the weapons and ammunition that used in capturing Misrata, the Western Mountains, Benghazi and Kufra came from the Sudanese armoury. President Bashir further stated that, the forces that entered Tripoli got all their armaments including logistic and information from Sudan (cited in Ahmed, 2013). Ahmed (2013) further hinted that:

The Sudanese hoped that, the Libyans may appreciate the Sudanese supporting role. If there had been no such Sudanese support to the Libyan revolutionaries, the Kufra zone would not have been liberated from Qaddafi brigades...unless for Sudan’s intervention, the Libyan Transitional Council may not have communicated politically with the Government of Niger, because its leadership was still supporting the Libyan ex-regime (p.50).

Emulative linkage constitutes the next concept used by Rosenau to explain state relations. This is concerned with the demonstration effect. It involves copying the initiating state without directly involving in the home state crisis. Syrian crisis is a good example of emulative linkage in this context. It should be recalled that most fighters that supported the anti Qaddafi, came from neighbouring states such as; Sudan, Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Chad, Niger even Morocco. In the same vein, most of them are members of violent extremist groups such as Islamic State of Syria, and Levant (ISIS) as well as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), therefore, immediately, the Qaddafi regime fell in 2011, they departed to Syria, joined the rebel groups there and fought Bashar al-Assad. International Crisis Group (2013) recalled that:

The volunteers are quality personnel, carefully selected by...organization, after spending a period in a training camp in Libya. They reportedly cross the Tunisian border to attend those training camps and are then flown from the Libyan capital to Istanbul in Turkey before travelling to the front... They prefer to help the armed opposition in Syria... (pp 28-29).

Finally, Rosenau (1969) assumed adaptive as the last concept in the linkage theory. This concept portrays a state of stability, irrespective of on-going crisis. The crisis in Libya is mainly exaggerated by the media houses. However, within Libya, the citizens, though in crisis are still living normal lives. The government at Tripoli is maintaining skeletal services to the people. Winer (2019) maintained that, the Central Bank of Libya is still paying the salaries of workers and the militias that provide security in Tripoli. The National Oil Cooperation is still exporting oil to the international market, thereby generating foreign exchange to the country. As Winer (2019) hinted, further;

Despite these challenges and others, including ongoing power outages and runs on the Bank, Libya’s institutions have successfully avoided both progress and collapse. It has remained in the interests of those who hold power to maintain the status quo rather than to take chances on change. The system is working to some extent as evidenced by the fact that for most of 2018, Libya was pumping around one million barrels per day (bp1), generating some 25 billion a year in revenue... (p.18).

### **3. FACTORS FOR PROLONGATION OF POST QADDAFI LIBYAN CRISIS**

Unarguably, Libya is a classical example of a “failed state.” The failure is manifested in the total collapse of state institutions. The executive organ, the judiciary, even the basic infrastructure collapsed immediately Qaddafi’s regime ended in 2011. This is because Qaddafi operated a caucus regime in which his relatives, natives and associates were running the government. Regrettably, these were the same group of people in which the revolutionaries were targeting to eliminate. Some of them were killed along with Qaddafi, while some embarked on exile in Tunisia, Algeria, Niger, Chad and Egypt.

The non-state actors, especially the militias and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) filled the vacuum created due to the state absence. The militias who grouped themselves into various brigades exercised the rule of police force, military as well as prison guard. They were mainly out for vengeance against the pro-Qaddafi groups. Thousands of the militias who ousted the former leader and his government exercised “victor justice.” They were above the law and acted with the highest level of impunity. Eljarh (2016) explained further that, “the vacuum left behind following the uprising in 2011 was filled with heavily armed militias and groups that lack any sense of professionalism, discipline or cohesion. Such circumstances have made the tasks of Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) and Security Sector Reform (SSR) an impossible mission for successive weak governments that took power since 2011.” (p.6).

The armed militias performed the roles of police, prosecutors, judges and jailers. They arrested their perceived enemy (mainly pro-Qaddafi groups) investigate them, detained or even killed them without any order of restraint from the National Transitional Council (NTC). Since 2011, immediately after the fall of Qaddafi’s government, the number of people arrested, including foreigners that have no link with past government are in thousands. The militias are now worse than Qaddafi and his groups; since they are not controlled by the Government of National Accord nor the international community. It should be recalled that between 2012 to 2013, 18 senior security officers were killed by the militias in Benghazi on the pretext that they were officials of the former regime. International Crisis Group (2013) recorded further that, on 3<sup>rd</sup> December 2012, Naji Hamed, a police officer who arrested a militia in Benghazi escaped assassination, but lost his brother to the heartless groups.

In the same vein, the militia groups assassinated al Dreisi, a senior military commander during the Qaddafi era and the criminal investigation office in charge of his death was attacked in Benghazi on 2<sup>nd</sup> January 2013. Added to this, is the unwillingness of the state to investigate and prosecute those that involved in unlawful killing of prisoners of war since 2012. International Crisis Group (2013) lamented that:

Effort by lawyers and judges to bring to justice revolutionaries: alleged to have committed act of torture and ill treatment have either been blocked by the office of the general prosecutor, prompted retaliatory violence...or led to death threats against lawyers, victims and in some cases their families. This has made many lawyers...fearful to bring cases forward, particularly...act of torture at the hands of...powerful militia groups (pp.30).

Impunity is reigning in Libya and the people are helpless. However, “the erosion of the state authority has further emboldened armed groups, some of which appear to be aligned with specific political factions” (International Crisis Group, 2013, p.37). This brings the role of Islamist groups into focus. Truly speaking Libyan society was highly conservative during the era of Qaddafi. The only Islamic group that the state permitted was Sunni. However, the death of Qaddafi resurrected Muslim Brotherhood; a group whose member were brutally killed and some of them imprisoned at Abu Salim by the regime in 1998. They claimed that they formed the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) that ensured the security of the entire eastern Libya, therefore, their leader Belhaj should be the rightful officer in charge of the Tripoli military council. It should be recalled that after the United Nations committee indicted the group and as an affiliate of al Qaeda, hence banned by the world body on 11<sup>th</sup> September 2001, most Western countries, especially United States, France and Britain regard Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) who later changed its name Libyan Islamic Movement for Change (LIMC) as a terrorist organization. This group insisted that the government must be formed in line with Sharia Law, and their members should constitute the majority in all arms of government. International Crisis Group (2011) cited Ali Sallabi, a group member saying “the islamists own the street...Islam was the fuel of this revolution, it motivated people...just as they have been a fundamental part of the revolution, they will play a fundamental part in the building of the new Libya” (p.11). In the same vein, Mustapha Jalil, a known Libyan Islamic Scholar maintained that “...Islamic law would be the principal basis for legislation in post Qaddafi Libya...and that laws banning polygamy should be repealed and interest on bank loan banned...” (cited in International Crisis Group, 2011, p.12). Therefore, the National Transitional Council was in a state of dilemma on whether to adopt secular government or Islamic regime in the new Libya. Even the most radical Islamic group, Salafi, are seeking for full participation in new Libya. They claimed that their presence was felt in the eastern Libya, especially Benghazi, before the entire state was liberated by brigade

commanders, therefore, they should not be sidelined in the new government. As Vogler (2012) captured it:

In the east, where Salafism and rejectionists appear to be based, many militia members are frustrated that they have not been able to translate their military success into political gains, they see themselves as the seat and soul of the revolution, and they believe that their success has been co-opted by those who did not sacrifice as much (p.3).

Regrettably, their fighting arm; Ansar al Sharia Brigade was closely associated with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Therefore, bringing this violent extremist group into government will provoke United States, Britain and France and would lead to international sanction and isolation. Sour (2015) traced the origin of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb to the amalgamation of four terrorist Islamic groups from Sahel region in September 2006. These groups include; Algerian Salafist Group, for Preaching and Combat, Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group, Libyan Islamic Combatant Group, Tunisian Islamic Combatant Group, including other smaller Islamic groups from Mauritania, Mali and Niger. The basic characteristic of the Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is that, it has strong alliance with al Qaeda. Since state presence in the Sahel and the Maghreb is limited, these groups effect their terrorist activities with impunity. They involve in kidnapping for ransom, trafficking in persons and drugs, and above all smuggle arms to other terrorist groups in Africa such as Boko Haram in Nigeria as well as Al Shabab in Somalia. According to Sour (2015).

They operate over a vast area of region, covering thousands of kilometres from the Eastern part of Algeria to Northern Niger through Eastern Mauritania, and to Mauritania's border with Senegal. The movement is currently made up of...fighters scattered all over this vast desert area. It is divided into several sub-groups, which are particularly mobile, capable of rapidly moving from one country to the next to evade security services (p.10).

The presence of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is a hindrance to peaceful resolution of Libyan Crisis. This group has a strong link with Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIS) and their major aim is to commit havoc wherever, there is Western presence and above all, to Islamize the whole world. International Crisis Groups (2016) explained further that, "ISIS and al-Qaeda-linked groups are among the most powerful protagonists in many of the world deadliest crises and may exploit divisions elsewhere...their sophisticated recruitment...groups beliefs, strategies, tactics and targets...aims to return society to a purer form of Islam and believe that fighting a violent jihad...is a religious duty" (p.2). Ansar al-Sharia group that are mainly found in the eastern region of Libya is the recruitment hub of the ISIS and its al Qaeda affiliate. This is the same group that killed Christopher Stephen, a former United States Ambassador to Libya in Benghazi on 11<sup>th</sup> September 2012. Immediately the United States Consulate was attacked, a serious mayhem was inflicted on International Committee of Red Cross, British as well as Tunisian Consulates in Benghazi the same day by the same group. Denoeux (2013) maintained that, "though responsibility for the assault on the US Consulate in Benghazi has yet to be firmly established, the chief suspects include the radical Salafi organization known as Imprisoned Omar Abdel Rahman Brigades (IOARB) as well as individuals affiliated with the Libyan Ansar al-Sahria (Aas)" (p.4). Libyan Ansar al Sharia was responsible for the bombing of police stations in Benghazi and Darnah in April 2013. The Italian Consul and the Egyptian Coptic Church in Benghazi were attacked by the same group on 14<sup>th</sup> March, 2013. Westerners and their properties were the target of the extremist group. The attack also extended to French Embassy in Tripoli on 23<sup>rd</sup> April 2013. The building was destroyed even though no life was lost. Denoeux (2013) hinted that:

It is believed to have been carried out in reprisal for France's military intervention in Mali (including France's decision the day before the attack, to extend its military mission in that country). The bombing was significant, in that, it represented the most spectacular strike at a western interest in the country...but also...the first major attack on a western target, and against foreign interests more generally, in the Libyan Capital since the fall of Qaddafi (p.5).

Unfortunately, the General National Council under the leadership of Prime Minister Sarraj; was weak and incapable of exercising control over these violent groups. Hence, General Khalifah Haftar had to form Libyan National Army (LNA) in May 2014 with the sole aim of carrying out offensive which he tagged "Operation Dignity" to neutralize the Islamic terrorist groups, General Haftar had recorded



tremendous success in fighting the Islamic groups. International Crisis Groups (2016) maintained that, “in Libya, ISIS has not made significant progress. It has a limited static presence in Benghazi...it has been pushed out of Derna, another city with a history of jihadist activity, where Ansar al-Sharia and some al Qaeda-linked groups dominate. Libya is not torn along the sectarian fault lines of Iraq or Syria...” (p.20). Unfortunately, Libyans had price to pay for the relative peace in Tripoli and its environs. Blanchard (2020) posited that:

Fighting since 2019 has killed more than 2,600 Libyans, including hundreds of civilians, and fighting in June 2020 displaced 28,000 people in western and central area, bringing the total displaced to more than 40,000. LNA forces and partners control much of Libya’s territory...and key oil production and export infrastructure directly or through local partners...”(p.4).

Presently, the security situation in Libya is fragile, and the capability of the state to effect its presence is completely weak. This is why Denoeux (2013) lamented that, “as long as the state lacks the legitimacy, credibility and enforcement capacity, groups will choose to remain armed, since they do not trust the government’s ability to protect them and their community...” (p.16).

### 4. IMPACTS OF POST QADDAFI LIBYAN CRISIS ON NORTH AFRICAN NEIGHBOURS

Unarguably, the death and the subsequent fall of Qaddafi’s regime in 2011, has affected the following North African neighbours negatively;

#### 4.1. Algeria

The western neighbour of Libya is Algeria. It has about 43.9 people in 2020. Since Libyan crisis in 2011, Algeria has been seeking for peace in the entire region. It has entered into various negotiations with local forces (Haftar, Aguita, Jibril, Shwyle etc) as well as external elements (France, United States, United Kingdom, Italy, United Nations Arab League etc) for the purpose of bringing peace to Libya. Algeria needs peace in Libya because of its past experience with the Islamic Salvation Front in which the state fought the group between 1992 to 1997. The devastating impacts of that crisis is still hunting Algeria till date, therefore, unstable Libya, would add another burden to its woes. Even when United Nations Security Council passed 1973 Resolution that permitted NATO to intervene militarily in Libya, Algeria was against it., According to International Crisis Group (2015), “it warned that intervention would result in tribal infighting, arms flooding the region and a steep rise in jihadist attacks- all of which came to pass” (.14).

Regrettably, the collapse of the Qaddafi regime in 2011 created opportunity for Islamic militant, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) that fled northern Mali, following French military bombardments to attack Algeria. This attack that took place on 16<sup>th</sup> January 2013 was led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar (also known as Mr. Marlboro), a known terrorist and a leader of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) that settled in southern Libya. It should be recalled that Mokhtar Belmokhtar and his cohorts attacked gas field at Tengatourine in In Amena, a region in Algeria that is close to Libyan border. The group who later spilt from the al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and formed a new terrorist gangs; “Al-Mouthalimin” took over the entire facility that was operated by companies from Algeria, France, Japan, Norway and United Kingdom. Alexander (2013) hinted that:

The terrorists, who reportedly trained for two months in Mali and were heavily armed, held some 700 Algerians and 134 foreign nationals hostage. The attackers demanded ... the withdrawal of French forces from Mali and offered to free United States’ captives in exchange for the release of its Egyptian leader Omar Abdel-Rahman and Iraq’s top scientist, Aafia Siddiqui.

The Tengatourine gas plant is a joint venture between Norway’s Statoil, British Petroleum and the State Owned Company, Sonatrach. It produces 10 percent of the natural gas consumed locally and generates appropriately 5 million dollars per day to Algerian economy. Therefore, the state cannot be silent over the terrorists attack at the facility. The government ignored negotiation with the Islamists, rather launched a military rescue mission. The operation that took more than two days was later successful, with limited damages. Alexander (2013) hinted that, “after...50 hours of fierce fighting Algeria announced that 685 Algerians and 101 foreigners had been freed by the operation but death toll was costly – 11 Algerians and 37 foreign nationals (including 3 Americans, 3 Britons, and 10 Japanese)” (p.12). Immediately after this attack, that was a spillover of Libyan crisis, President

Bouterflika of Algeria imposed strict border control measure on Libya-Algeria corridor. International Crisis Group (2015) maintained that:

He ordered the closure of the crossing to Libya and Mali, conditioned access to border zones on military permission and deployed ground and air forces to enforce the new rules, with particular focus on the Libyan frontiers... 100,000 troops are now actively deployed at the borders at least double the previous number the army created a new military zone... vowed to destroy on sight any unidentified convoy of vehicles approaching from the Libyan side (p.7).

The border closure caused hardship, especially food shortage for Ghat province, a region in Libya bordering Algeria. However, Algerian Prime Minister, Abdelmalek Sellal responded positively by instructing Algerian Red Crescent "to prepare a humanitarian convoy for Ghat and nearby Libya towns, and ordered that border controls be relaxed." (International Crisis Group, 2013, p.7).

### 4.2. Tunisia

Tunisia has a population of about 11.9 million people in 2020 and occupies the northeastern border of Libya. Unlike Algeria that integrates Islamic group especially Muslim Brotherhood into its domestic policy, Tunisia sees them as a threat to the state security. Infact, Islamic related violence started in Tunisia in 2011, after the collapse of the Ben Ali's regime in that year. The Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia who later forms part of the al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) attacked and released 2,500 prisoners who were jailed by the state for radicalism and violence in January 2011. The same man, Mokhtar Belmokhtar and his group, Al-Mourabitoun that masterminded Algerian's Tengtourine attack had recruited and trained more than 4,000 Tunisians for jihadist activities in Tunisia (Lounnas, 2018). According to Lounnas (2018):

Between 2011 and 2015, the Tunisian-Libyan roads had become a sort of highway for jihadism...large number of Tunisia candidates for jihad were going to Libya where there was no state, proliferation of weapons and all kinds of other trafficking. Indeed, the chaos in Libya, played a pivotal role in helping the Tunisian jihadists, in the sense that they received support from local Libyan jihadist organizations including Ansar al Sharia of Libya. This enabled them to receive training and weapons in Libya (p.12).

Furthermore, the border between Libya and Tunisia is expansive and porous, therefore, policing it, is a tough task for Tunisian security forces. Immediately Qaddafi regime collapsed in 2011, Tunisia received between 800,000 to 1,000,000 Libyans that crossed the border and settled in refugees' camps (Choucha, el Hayet, Remade and Tataourine). in Tunisia. International Crisis Group (2013) reported that Tunisian army discovered from the refugees, various types of weapons. These include; surface to air missiles, Kalashnikov guns, Russian RPG rocket launchers, anti-personnel mines, grenades, 9mm pistols, ammunition, and material for making improvised explosive devices detonators among others. The truth is that most refugees were late Qaddafi's fighters who fled to refugee's camps in Tunisia immediately that regime collapsed. Majority of the refugees that passed through Ras Jibir and Dhehila-Wazen border posts into Tunisia were the pro regime combatants; who sold off their military possessions, including automatic 9 mm pistols AK 47 assault rifles which they brought into the country for re-assembly. International Crisis Group (2013) alerted that, "Salafis who...help distribute food in the refugee camps reportedly used preaching tents to buy and sell military equipment" (p.17). Similarly, Tunisian volunteers who went to assist anti-Qaddafi groups in Libya also came back with various types of arms into the country. Presently, Tunisia is awash with arms and the possibility of future violent uprising is undoubtful.

Furthermore, the Tunisian economy has been affected by the Libyan crisis, negatively. During Qaddafi era, Libyan goods were sold to the neighbouring countries in a cheaper price. This so, because, Libyan government subsidized the cost of production of nearly all goods produced in Libya. For example, coral which is produced in the Tabarka region of Libya is sold cheaply in Tunisia. Tunisia depends on Libyan foodstuffs (which government subsidized), livestock, construction materials such as; cement, reinforcing bars, clothing, firearms as well as fuel. Libya also imported chemical, fertilizers, phosphates, ceramics, livestock, foodstuffs including contraband goods like alcohol and cannabis from Tunisia. Similarly, fuel, furniture, household properties, electronic appliances, vehicles, pharmaceutical drugs (especially psychotropic drugs and subutex and tramadol tablet) and military equipment are imported into Tunisia from Libya. Regrettably, all these goods can no longer enter Tunisia, or leave Tunisia to Libya in a formal manner; since the collapse of Qaddafi

regime. Smuggling of contraband goods including drugs from Libya to Tunisia, vice versa is now normal. International Crisis Group (2013) decried that, “drug trafficking is on the rise...the consumption of drugs has increased despite its criminalization...the quantity of cannabis traded has also increased...the increase in trade...made the border even more porous...in the context characterized by...growing instability in Libya” (p.15).

### 4.3. Egypt

Egypt is the immediate neighbor of Libya, in the east, and has an estimated population of about 102.3 million people in 2020. The relationship between the two countries was not cordial following the expansive character of former Libyan Head of State, Qaddafi that resulted in four-day war in 1977. Though, they later reconcile, unfortunately, the two countries continued harbouring that crisis until the fall of Qaddafi's regime. Egypt played a very significance role that led to the end of that regime in 2011. Arrat (2017) alleged that Egyptian Air Force conducted airstrike against pro-Qaddafi forces during the crisis and also bombed Benghazi in 2014, on the pretext that it was attacking terrorist groups. In April 2016, the Egyptian President, Abdel Fattah al-Sissi declared his support for General Haftar military group; Libyan National Army, “citing the need to rid Libya of extremist elements” (Arraf, 2017, p.9). Egypt like every other country that borders Libya also bore the brunt of the crisis. International Organization for Migration (2011) even claimed that, “Egypt was the first country neighbouring Libya to experience the effect of the crisis. As early as 22 February 2011, Egyptians as well as migrants and Libyans started fleeing Libya while the Libyan city of Benghazi, some 800km from the border, was raising up against Qaddafi's regime.” (p.13). Again, between 22<sup>nd</sup> to 25<sup>th</sup> February 2011, about 46,700 people in which 81% were Egyptians and the remaining 19% were people from Third Country Nationals (TCN) were evacuated to Egypt. This spurred Egyptian authorities and humanitarian organizations like International Organization for Migration (IOM), Red Cross, World Food Programme, World Health Organization, United Nations, and High Commissioner for Refugees among others to take immediate action. The International Organization for Migration in conjunction with World Food Programme and el Makhtoum Foundation in Egypt distributed food to 110,015 refugees in various camps. On 30<sup>th</sup> April 2011, the World Health Organization also treated 400 people from Third Country Nationals (TCN) who were suffering from scabies in the camps (International Organization for Migration, 2011).

Furthermore, trafficking in small arms and light weapons threatened Egyptian security. Libya was awash with arms of various types spread all over the country. It was easily accessed during the crisis and most of the refugees and the pro-Qaddafi soldiers who left Libya came to the refugee camps with weapons. Bakrania (2014) decried that:

Since the demise of Qaddafi, arms smuggling out of Libya to Egypt...has increased. Qaddafi was distrustful of the army and scattered part of his weapons stocks throughout Libya...unguarded arsenals became easily accessible to looters, rebels and others wishing to traffic them including tribes, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) as well as mercenaries who participated in the Libyan conflict (p.4).

Economically, the crisis in Libya also affected Egypt negatively. Egypt has high rate of unemployed and underemployed youths. Libya was the best destination for them, since the economy of that country was better than any of its neighbouring states. According to International Organization for Migration (2012), “Libya ranks on top of the list of destination of Egyptian migrants. This is the result of geographical proximity and various open border policies that until 2006 allowed Egyptians to enter and reside in Libya with an Identity Card (ID) only” (Pp.1-2). Therefore, when that crisis started in Libya, most of them were killed and those that returned home became unemployed. Statistics from the International Organization for Migration (2012) indicated that:

As of March 9, 65,000 Egyptians entered Tunisia from Libya while 82,800 returned from Libya through the Sallum border in the month of 19 February to 22 March. Based on this data, it can be estimated that 147,800 Egyptian lost their jobs in Libya (and potentially all of their belongings, due to the crisis and may now be looking for employment in Egypt (p.1).

### 4.4. Sudan

The south eastern border of Libya is bounded by Sudan. The population figure of Sudan in 2020 was about 43.8 million people. The relationship between Libya with Sudan was not friendly. Qaddafi

made every effort to support all the rebellious elements in Sudan; Justice and Equity Movement (JEM) as well as Darfur Rebel that threatened the sovereignty of Sudan.

Sudan would have continued to endure Qaddafi, but for the fact that Kihalil Ibrahim, the leader of Justice and Equity Movement (JEM) went with his troops to support Qaddafi hence Sudan used that as an excuse to support the rebel forces. Added to this, was the UN Security Council Resolution 1973 that imposed “no fly zone” and permitted foreign nations to intervene in Libyan crisis, gave Sudanese government the impetus to retaliate all the atrocities committed by Qaddafi on Sudan. Ahmed (2011) hinted that:

The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) played a vital role to expel Qaddafi elements from the city of Kufra... Later on, Kufra town was handed over to the rebel...in the heat of battle between Qaddafi and rebels in Misrata, Zintan, Aj dabiya and other Libyan cities, several armed groups backed by the Qaddafi regime tried to move out of Libya with significant military equipment and huge funds. But the coordination efforts between Sudan, the NTC and international forces became a key tool in defeating the Qaddafi’s regime (p.46).

Despite the role played by the Sudanese government to topple Qaddafi’s regime, the smuggling of small arms and light weapons from Libya into Darfur region could not be dictated by the Sudanese security agents. Weapons that were smuggled by the Justice and Equity Movement (JEM) from Libyan arsenal into the Darfur region, included rocket propelled grenades, machine guns with anti-aircraft visors, automatic rifles, ammunition, grenade explosives (semtex) and light anti-aircraft artillery among others (UN Security Council, 2012). The good news is that, since the death of Qaddafi and their leader Kihalil Ibrahim in 2011, the crisis in Darfur has come to an end.

### 5. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO POST QADDAFI LIBYAN CRISIS

Since the demise of Qaddafi and the collapse of his government in 2011, the Western Libya, especially Satire and its environs have been occupied by the militants and the terrorists’ groups. The al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Islamic State of Syria and Levant (ISIS) have used the western Libya as a base to launch attacks on Libya and its neighbouring states. In the same vein, General Haftar, the leader of Libyan National Army (LNA) has dominated the entire southern and the central Libya on the pretext that he is fighting the Islamic groups, thereby creating chaotic situation in Libya. Megerisi (2019) explained further that:

Since Haftar began his advance on Tripoli, ISIS has stepped up its attacks across southern and central Libya while the Libyan forces that fought ISIS are engaged in battles with Haftar. The group has been emboldened to carve out a safe haven in which it can regroup, before launching attacks on the security forces and civilian infrastructure, as well as seizing resources. (p. 16).

Presently, there is no state presence in Libya. The government is weak, its population has scattered all over the neighbouring states, its sovereignty has been degraded and above all its territory is habited by the violent extremist groups. Therefore, international community can never allow, the threats from the non-state actors and a vacuum in governance to exist unabated. Action must be taken to prevent another Syria in North Africa. Expectedly, the immediate neighbours take the lead. It should be recalled that between March and April 2012, Algeria and Libya signed bipartite agreement on common security issues. In August 2013, Libya and Algeria decided to enter into agreement on joint commission to tackle cross border incursion by smugglers and terrorists. Bakrania (2014) posited that in that same August 2013, the Algerian Prime Minister, M Zeidan announced that Libyan police would be trained by Algeria. International Crises Group (2015) also maintained that:

Since Libya’s transition disintegrated in July 2014, and the government split into two competing authorities. Algeria has advocated national reconciliation through an inclusive process bringing together rivals including Islamists and Qaddafi officials. It has pushed a consensual, democratic solution culminating in election and a new constitution. (pp. 14 – 15).

Gulhane (2013) also hinted that Egypt and Libya had signed military cooperation agreement in April 2013. The military cooperation agreement between the two states, was in the areas of joint military training, illegal immigration, illegal fishing operations and drug trafficking. Regrettably, Egypt also supports General Haftar. This support, according to Megerisi (2019), “stems from a mixture of economic opportunism, direct threats to its security interests, and Haftar and President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s sheared ideology of militarism as the only antidote to an existential Islamic threat” (p.5).



However, it was widely believed that General Haftar assault on Tripoli in April 2019 was supported by Egypt. Similarly, Ahmed (2011) maintained that:

The fall of the Qaddafi regime produced a new equation in the region and ended the instability situation concerning Libyan-Sudanese relations, thus allowing many opportunities to build new foundations and to contribute to the formation of firm future relations between Sudan and Libya, on the basis of good neighbourly relations and common interests. (p.5).

It should be recalled that immediately Qaddafi's regime ended in 2011, Sudanese government continued to monitor its borders with Libya. Omar El-Haj (2013) posited that in May 2013, the Sudanese and Libyan Defence Ministers agreed to activate joint protocol on strategic cooperation, especially in the area of border control trafficking and illegal immigration. Tunisian government on her part had signed a bipartite agreement with Libya on security cooperation in March 2012. According to Bakrania (2014), the areas that agreement covered include; joint border patrol, the reactivation of checkpoints, as well as improved cooperation in the exchange of information. Tunisia also protected itself effectively, against the infiltration of its territory by the militia and terrorist groups from Libya. Lounnas (2018) explained further that;

Faced with this major threat, the Tunisian government, supported by the international community especially France and the United States and its regional allies (Algeria) began to react...having declare the state of emergency, the authority took the decision to close the borders with Libya and to build a "protective wall" there...this wall, built with western support, played major role in gradually restoring security and considerably reducing the infiltration of jihadist from Libya (p.13).

United States of America had made a lot of efforts in bringing peace to Libya. Former President Barrack Obama had issued Executive Order 13566, in February 2011, declaring a national emergency in Libya as well as blocking Libya's property under United States jurisdiction, including Qaddafi, his family, and other designated individuals. This Executive Order prohibits Libya's property under United States jurisdiction; restrict movement into United States of all those individuals and entities that engage in threatening peace and stability of Libya. Those that involved in obstructing, undermining, delaying or impeding the adoption of transfer of power to the Government of National Accord, or successor government were also restricted from entering United States. In 2016, Obama's government also sanctioned Khalifa Ghwell, the former Prime Minister in Governing National Congress (GNC) and Aqilah Saleh, the leader of House of Representative (HOR) for obstructing the implementation of the Libya Political Agreement (LPA). In the same vein, former President, Trump in September 2018 placed sanctions on Ibrahim Jadhraan, a militia leader that based in eastern Libya and responsible for Severe attacks on oil facility in central Libya. Trump also sanctioned Salah Badi, a militia leader based in western Libya, who was responsible for various attacks on Tripoli, in 2018 (Blanchard, 2020). In 2013, the United States government initiated Export Control and Related Border Security Programme (ECRBSP). The purpose of this programme was to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, destabilizing accumulations and irresponsible transfer of conventional weapons in the Maghreb region. States in the Maghreb region; such as Libya, Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco were the beneficiaries of that programme. Bakrania (2014) posited that:

Between February 2011 and August 2012, the United States provided a total of, USD170 million in assistance to Libya. This includes support towards the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of militia members and justice and security sector development...the United States is supporting conventional weapons mitigation efforts including the survey, inventory and disposal of known weapons and ammunition storage sites. The United States Department of Defense is providing advisory support to the Libyan Ministry of Defence through Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI) (p.15).

Furthermore, though United Kingdom has not played significant role in Libyan crisis, it should be remembered that it supported the UN Security Council Resolution 1973, that imposed "no fly zone" on Libyan air space, thereby saving lives of civilians and vulnerable groups. United Kingdom also partook in NATO's bombardments of pro-Qaddafi groups. Dirus and Eaton (2019) confirmed that, "the United Kingdom backs the United Nations' action plan for Libya. The United Kingdom sees itself as an important balancing presence amongst diverging European positions" (p.17). Again, the Libyan Stabilization Response is a pet project of United Kingdom. In 2012, United Kingdom initiated

that project in order to assist Libya in policing, advising, training as well as strengthening the institutional capacity of the Ministry of Interior (Bakrania, 2014). Similarly, Italy also played important role towards resolving the Libyan crisis. It should be recalled that between December 2007 and August 2008, the two countries signed two different Bilateral Maritime Security Agreements. Though these agreements existed before the Libyan crisis in 2011, it helped in checkmating irregular migrants from being smuggled across the Mediterranean to Italy and Malta. It enabled the two countries to embark on joint naval patrol. Bakrania (2014) explained further that, “Italy provided Libya with a number of naval vessels and trained Libyan forces...; the two countries also put in place a comprehensive surveillance system for the southern border” (p.13). Italian interest in Libya also anchored on economy. The energy need of Italy comes from Libya and its Multinational Oil Company, Eni, which is exploiting in eastern Libya. Regrettably, Dirus and Eaton (2019) decried that, “while Italy, has sought to reach out to forces in the east of Libya, and Haftar in particular, it doesn’t have the...network or influence there” (p.16). This hindered its capacity to bring peace to Libya.

France has been an old player in Sahel and Maghreb regions of Africa. France complied with the UN Security Council Resolution 1973, and partook effectively in the bombardments of pro-Qaddafi offices through NATO platform. Unlike Italy whose aim was to checkmate irregular migrants in its territory, France spent time and resources to bring peace to the warring factions in Libya. It should be recalled that President Emmanuel Macron consulted widely and further invited Libyan Prime Minister Sarraj, Head of State Council, Khaled Messhri, the leader of Libyan National Army (LNA), General Haftar as well as the Speaker of House of Representative (HoR) Aguila to an inclusive dialogue on 29<sup>th</sup> May 2018. Immediately, the talks concluded, President Macron announced that, leaders present had agreed in principle to support Salame Plan that included national conference, permanent constitution as well as election of President and parliament on 10<sup>th</sup> December 2018. Winer (2019) hinted that:

...it was immediately followed by General Haftar and Speaker Aguila telling their followers that, they had agreed to nothing in Paris. Moreover, diplomats were privately saying that France had given General Haftar too much attention and he was taking the Macron’s initiative as a sign that France was ready to join Russia, the United Arab Emirate and Egypt to support him taking power by force if necessary (p.19).

Russia’s commitment towards peaceful resolution of the Libyan crisis is doubtful. Russia is supporting General Haftar against the UN Security Council’s resolutions on Libya. It sees Libya as a new avenue for power play among the superpowers. Dirus and Eaton (2019) maintained that, Russia invited General Haftar for a meeting at Moscow and provided him with small arms in 2014. In 2016, Russia printed 4 billion Libyan Dinar to the Eastern Central Bank of Libya at Tobruk. In the same vein, Romazan Kadyrov of Chechen had welcomed most militia leaders into Chechenya, while Mikhail Bogdanov, the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister had facilitated exchange between Duina-Libya Contract-Group and Russian government. All these are violation of the international sanction, which was imposed on General Haftar and other militia groups. Megerisi (2019) explained further that:

Since 2014, there have been widespread report that Russia has provided military assistance to Haftar in the form of advisers, training and the maintenance of Russian weaponry through private military contractor, the Wagner Group. Recently there have been rumours of a Russian military presence in Haftar controlled areas such as the oil crescent, which Moscow may have deployed to benefit from illicit sales and Haftar’s forward operating bases in Western Libya. (p.6.).

Russian interest in Libya goes beyond politics. Dirus and Eaton (2019) alleged that, “Russian had a significant arms sale to the Qaddafi regime, so there is a drive to recover that lost market” (p.18). It would also be interested in contracts for the reconstruction of Libya. Another player that worth mentioning is China. China was a strong allied of the former government of Libya. However, when that government collapsed in 2011, China lost investment that worth 20 billion US Dollars. It is also important to remember that China did not approve United Nations intervention in Libya. Chinese action was in line with its principle of “non-interference.”

Multilaterally, United Nations Organization has made a lot of efforts toward bringing lasting peace to Libya. On 26<sup>th</sup> February 2011, the UN Security Council approved measures that aimed at sanctioning

Qaddafi's regime, imposing travel ban and arm embargo as well as freezing Qaddafi family assets. The world body also referred Qaddafi's case to International Criminal Court (ICC) at Hague. Similarly, on 17<sup>th</sup> March, 2011, UN Security Council voted and authorized military action against Qaddafi regime, including "no fly zone" in order to protect the civilian population. This decision contained in UN Security Council Resolution 1973 (Lounnas, 2018). Again, International Crisis Group (2013) recalled that the United Nations brokered a power-sharing agreement among various groups in December 2015. This agreement that was tagged "Libyan Political Agreement" (LPA), established Government of National Accord (GNA), headed by Prime Minister Sarraj with 9 members that constitute Presidency Council (PC). These members were to be drawn from various constituencies and factions throughout Libya. "Although the Government of National Accord received recognition from the UN Security Council as the legitimate government of Libya, it struggled to consolidate its authority in both eastern and western halves of the country" (Bakrania, 2014). Effort to bring lasting peace has not been materialized in view of the fact that General Haftar, the leader of Libyan National Army (LNA) and the Speaker Aguila, the leader of the House of Representative (HOR) preferred to control eastern Libya with their capital at Tobruk instead of joining the United Nations' backed government, headed by Prime Minister Sarraj in Tripoli.

However, it is worthy to note that, UN Human Rights Council had approved the creation of a Fact-Finding Mission to Libya (FFML) in June 2020. According to Blanchard (2020) the terms of reference of the mission is "to investigate and preserve evidence of human rights abuses...in northwestern Libya. Evidence has emerged of deliberate mining and body-trapping of civilian homes...extrajudicial killings...looting and forced displacement...and the murder of migrants" (p.18).

### 6. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The fragile peace, which is presently prevailing in Libya, could be attributed to the endless efforts of the United Nations. In January 2021, the United Nations convened a meeting for all the major warring groups including 70 power brokers and their representatives. The agreement in that meeting was that, there must be immediate cease-fire and all foreign fighters must leave Libya within three months. Abdul Hamid Dbeibah was chosen as the Prime Minister while Mohammed al Menfi became the Head of Presidential Council. There was also a proposal for general elections in December 2021. This proposal is good, since legitimate government can only emerge through ballot box not barrel of gun as assumed by General Haftar. Winer (2019) had posited that:

To provide stability, Libya's leaders would need to be elected with a strong national mandate, govern with competence and inclusiveness, initiate economic and security reforms early, and secure comprehensive and rigorous international support from the outset...gaps in these foundations would be likely...lead to cracks in any new government's legitimacy, effectiveness and stability, engendering contexts for power, and the risk of renewed conflict (p.24).

The general elections will bring inclusiveness, since the government that would emerge belongs to the people of Libya. The Tabu, Tuareg and all other marginalized groups, especially those from non-Arbas in southern Libya should have a say in government. They should not be seen as foreigners, rather citizens who have stake in Libyan affairs. Late Qaddafi's tribe, Qadhahdfa should not be punished, as a result of their past involvement in government, rather should be integrated into the new Libya. As International Crisis Group (2012) alerted that, "the next war in Libya, if it happens, won't be between pro-Qaddafi and anti-Qaddafi...but among communities...when you find your brothers in need and you have the power to help...don't ignore them" (p.21). In the same vein, the elected officials who are expected to practice inclusiveness, must address the socio-economic needs of the people, Libyans are suffering. The population that is presently residing in Libya is less than those in refugee camps in Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt. Those in refugee camps are facing serious humanitarian crises. They lack food, shelter, water, medicine and above all, insecure. The new government should consider their immediate safe return to their home state, Libya. Even those who are in Libya are not safe, and their economic conditions are deteriorating on daily basis. Salaries are not regularly paid, the food subsidies on basic goods such as bread had been removed, water and electricity are mainly for government officials in Tripoli and Benghazi. Dirus and Eaton (2019) stated further that:

Extended blackouts have become a fact of life for most Libyans in the sweltering summer months. In many cases where phased blackouts are required to keep the grid operational, armed groups have been

known to prevent the electricity being shut down in their areas, exacerbating the problems elsewhere. In October 2017,...homes in the capital that were dependent on the Great Man Made River went without water for around two weeks (p.6).

Security Sector must also be given special priority. The fragmented security services in Libya is not good for anybody. The militias and the Islamists are guarding Tripoli, while Libyan National Army are protecting Benghazi. The fundamental rights of the people are frequently abused, since the security is weak and the judiciary has collapsed, therefore, elected government must address this sector as soon as possible. Recruitment must be conducted. Those militias who are not Islamists should be recruited into Libyan regular forces (police, military, border guard etc). Former Qaddafi forces should be re-employed while new recruitment should take immediate effect, to fill the existing vacancies in the security sector. Winer (2019) had advised that:

To achieve security for the long run, Libya requires national security institutions that include a national army as well as local police forces to supplant militias...Libyan army who served under Qaddafi, but...located elsewhere...militia members willing to give their allegiance to the state... be allowed to join local police or the national army on an individual basis. One could create incentives to make this possible by introducing a salary differential for those entering legitimate state institutions in lieu of militias and then phasing militia salaries out over time (p.28).

Furthermore, the immediate neighbours have a part to play towards the resolution of Libyan crisis. The threats of the violent extremist groups, Islamic State of Syria and Levant (ISS) and the al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) have already affected negatively on the entire Sahel and Maghreb regions of North Africa. Therefore, the time to act with a common voice is now, there is no time to wait. Borders should be monitored and if there is a need for international assistance, towards effective protection of the Sahel and Maghreb region, they should go ahead to seek for it. It should be remembered that the entire Sirte and its environs are controlled by the violent extremist groups. They are now using Sirte as a safe haven to launch attacks at the entire regions. Libya has collapse, there is no doubt about that, therefore, the neighbouring states should fill the vacuum in their governance. Denoeux (2013) decried that, "the continued inability of the state to monitor borders would create opportunities for increased linkage between local and or transnational violent extremist organizations as well as...cooperation between criminal networks linked to smuggling and trafficking" (p.18). In order to achieve a safe border, the elected government in Libya and her immediate neighbours should collaborate and form a Joint Border Guard. The Joint Border Guard should be trained and equipped by the governments of those states. They should have enough modern communication equipment, and liaise effectively with the border communities who harbour these terrorists. This could be effective if government presence is felt in the border communities. A situation in which border communities are neglected, nothing good can come from them to government. For instance, International Crisis Group (2013) interviewed Ahmed, a resident of Jendoubu (border village between Tunisia and Libya) in March 2013 who said:

The government...the people in the capital and the Sahel (the coast) have never done anything for us...it has nothing to do with us. They are not for us...the only thing that interests them...is the security of their border...The more they disregard us, the more we will close our eyes to what comes in and end up in their backyard (cited in International Crisis Group, 2013, p.24).

UN Security Council (2017) equally advised that, border communities in the Sahel and Maghreb regions should be given special attention by the neighbouring states to Libya. They should construct schools, provide medical services as well as involve them in community policing programme. This advice should be given adequate attention that it deserves, in view of the fact that, the terrorist groups members are living among the locals in the border communities. UN Security Council (2013) further lamented that "...in some areas, the humanitarian vacuum is being filled by al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb... where state presence is reduced or non-existent. This situation may enable...recruitment and local support networks for gathering information, supplying arms and ammunition, and other logistics" (p.7), to the Islamist groups.

Finally, international community should wake up from slumber. Presently, they have polarized their supports in Libya. United States, United Kingdom, France, Turkey, Qatar and Italy are the only supporters of UN-backed government in Tripoli. Regrettably, Russia, Egypt, United Arab Emirate,



Saudi Arabia are in full support of General Haftar and his military wing, Libyan National Army (LNA). Each of the factions has special interest in Libya, therefore, to encourage lasting solution to the crisis is becoming impossible. Unarguably, Russia and United States are interested in Libyan oil. Unfortunately, the Russian support to General Haftar is a breach of the United Nations Security Council Resolution. General Haftar is not ready for peaceful resolution of the crisis in Libya. Haftar continues to have false hope that the crisis in Libya will end in his favour. International community should rise up and impose sanction on those states that are supporting General Haftar since his deviant behavior is encouraged by them. This crisis will continue even if successful elections take place in Libya. The new government should be ready to face Haftar's challenges. General Haftar claims, he is fighting terrorist in Libya, however, the truth is that he wants to draw the state back to military rule. Winer (2019) explained further, "...rather than ending the terrorist threat in Libya, a military dictatorship headed by General Haftar, risks substantially, exacerbating it. Libya under General Haftar could come to resemble Syria under Bashar al-Assad" (p.21). Therefore, international community should unite now than ever before.

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**Citation:** Ekanem, EkanemAsukwo (Ph.D). " Post Qaddafi Libyan Crisis and its North African Neighbours " *International Journal of Political Science (IJPS)*, vol 8, no. 2, 2022, pp. 19-36. doi: <https://doi.org/10.20431/2454-9452.0802003>.

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