



Crisis Management in Foreign Affairs, Gearing Crisis Situations in Greek foreign and defence Policy

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Abstract: *The field of crisis management in international relations is currently facing a number of essential and important challenges, regarding theoretical, institutional and political dimensions. The research proposal presented in this paper aims at removing any existing limitations by bringing together interdisciplinary points of view. The main purpose of this article, characterized by the analysis of Greek foreign and defense policy and the government's capacities, is to cope with the turbulent (geo)political environment and to analyze the Greek mechanism of crisis management.*

The main empirical contribution of the study is a detailed reconstruction of Greek decision making and crisis management processes during the acute phase of the Imia crisis of 1996 (between Greece and Turkey). The case study draws upon archival materials, official documents and reports, mass media coverage, previous social science research, and interviews with crisis participants. This study concludes with a discussion of theoretical implications and potential lessons for practice.

Keywords: *Crisis Management, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Strategic Culture.*

1. INTRODUCTION

The complexity of contemporary crisis ('post-crisis') is posing great issues for the national structures, resources and roles of most international or supra-national organizations. The main objective of this article is to offer a conceptual analysis of crisis management in international relations/ politics (especially in foreign and defence policy), in reference to the essence of the strategic culture between Greece and Turkey. What is more, this research encourages a design specifying interdisciplinary and reflexive crisis management research. The methodological framework of the research proposed takes all the contemporary recommendations into account. In a few words, this research demonstrates a methodological approach and analysis of ways and concepts according to which we could have an efficient coping and dealing of high- stake matters of crisis situations in Greek foreign and defence policy, under the view of the strategic culture. The purpose is to demonstrate a methodological gearing 'instrumentarium' in crisis management. Firstly, a theoretical approach of International Relations (IR) theory will be conducted. Secondly, analytical and institutional framework permits the easy exploitation of existing and rich data from diverse sources and the projection of a new crisis management model. In order for the objectives of the study to be met, a wide range of data sources were used in the research. The sources of primary and secondary data (newspapers, internet) are referenced in the discussion. Obviously, we can understand that this issue is still in progress and therefore our analysis focuses on current data and findings.

Theoretical key-terms are essential. In addition, the analysis will be based on evaluating the whole crisis management system. Moreover, it is necessary to analyze why Greek government failed to cope sufficiently with Imia crisis.

The wider field of foreign and defense policy is a popular "common ground/place" study and analysis on both the international and domestic literature of international relations and strategic studies. At the heart of the field there is the specific subject of the management and handling of crises, which can be traced through the demonstration of strategic culture. On the basis of this almost axiomatic finding, this proposal revolves around the analysis and crisis management in the perpetually competitive and often confrontational international system on the basis of the concept of strategic

culture, between Greece and Turkey. One area that is particularly crucial in the context of a coherent institutional system of national foreign and defense policy.

In the international realm, it is a fact that crisis management requires, more than ever, decision models that take into account the strategic uncertainty and culture, the subjectivity of perceptions and put policy making into a rational formation. This article is moving in this direction, bringing to the forefront the art of governance and the capability of leadership and institutional functioning and efficiency in a demanding international and regional environment.

The starting point is the importance of proper scientific procedure, through the delimitation of social sciences and the absorption of the content of those associated with crisis management. In addition, crisis analysis and management is a cognitive field where various scientific disciplines meet. Therefore, the core of this proposal is validly interdisciplinary by compiling analytical tools from international relations, foreign policy analysis, administrative science, and strategic theory. At the same time, the concept of crisis and the demonstration of its “spectrum” is one of the solid pillars of its analysis. By focusing on the notion of “decision” (a fundamental concept in the field of analysing public policy and administrative science), it is possible to have a broader debate on strategic culture and to critically read the current trends in international relations.

Drawing on Aristotelian empiricism, this article supports a theoretical set of realistic principles and liberal proposals to highlight the analytical value of Joseph Nye’s intelligent/ smart power. This is because the parallel worlds or the realities of realism and liberalism coexist ontologically. Such epistemological as well as imperialistic rule gives the whole analysis a degree of analytical flexibility that can go beyond any knowledge-based confines for the sake of the political need to shape a coherent high national strategy.

As far as the Greek institutional framework is concerned, it is where the pathology of “governmentism”, which diffuses the entire governmental mechanism, and the atrophy of a genuinely decisive or advisory governmental body is ascertained. The recommendation of the National Security Council, which is widely adopted in the domestic (in Greece) literature, is not accredited without questioning. Such an institution would be useful only insofar as it joins a political, social, strategic and cognitive ‘whole’. In particular, the establishment and institutionalization of the National Security Council is not a structural panacea, ‘an institutional palace in the sand’ of obsessions or aspirations to be fulfilled. On the contrary, it must be the result of the treatment, through structures, of the diffusive and incompatible relationship, in terms of their organizational culture (and rationality), between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense. This article re-examines the concept of crisis management and sees it through its administrative, gnostic, strategic and political parameters. In addition, it takes into account contemporary epistemological debates in the field of international relations, proposing as a safe route the revision of our international consensus and a reflective proposal on Greece’s strategic doctrine. But also, the reference to the institutional and substantive redeployment of the political system and of the governmental organization and function is fundamental in its reasoning.

At the core of the proposal, the strategic vision and the institutional building of strategic planning and analysis that bind with the recommendation of the National Security Council (as a structural conclusion-act of the Council of Ministers) and are translated into a strategic doctrine that is flexible (from the point of view of the reflective validation of international relations and strategic theory) and compatible with the very nature of the Greek state, constitute the essence of the argument. The forwarding of a consensual national strategic culture embraces the spirit of writing and defines the dipole of institutions and leadership.

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. Theory of International Relations and Key-Terms

The framework summarized here is intended to assist in reliable identification of the relevant features which are to form the basis for our analysis. It should also be noted that this analytical attempt is based on the following key essences. This is a really helpful pathway in order to proceed with our pondering and objective.

Theories are constantly emerging and competing with one another as we see in Thomas Kuhn’s *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962). According to our analysis there have been two central

theories of IR: liberalism and realism. Particularly ‘liberalism proponents view human beings as innately good and believe peace and harmony between nations is not only achievable, but desirable’ (see I. Kant’s or USA President W. Wilson’s perspective). On the other hand, Realism focuses on the aspect that human beings as living in an orderless ‘state of nature’ that he perceived as a war of all against all. In this context, people are selfish and behave according to their own needs without necessarily taking into account the needs of others’ (see Hobbesian or Morgenthau’s point of view).¹In addition to the above stated IR theories Neorealism – or structural realism – is the bedrock theory of International Relations. Starting from a simple set of assumptions, it seeks to explain how states, in particular the most powerful ones, behave, and how they interact with each other on the international arena (see Kenneth Waltz’s remarkable attribution to IR theory). In accordance to Constructivism, the relationship between agents (individuals) and structures (such as the state)----- as one in which structures not only constrain agents but also construct their identities and interests (see Wendt: 1992).²Also let’s go to an important methodological step by referring to Kenneth Waltz’s (*Man, the State, and War*, 1959), levels of analysis, such as individual, state and international. The personalities of individual leaders, the values of particular nations as a whole or the characteristics of the international system as a whole’ are the reasons for ‘international acting’.³

In addition to those assumptions J. Rosenau (1987) pondering on *foreign policy* paved the path in which state’s ‘foreign policy involves at least an implicit conception of its international environment. How exactly this environment is understood, however, crucially shapes the possibilities of foreign policy theory’.⁴

Strategic culture according to Snyder can be best defined as ‘the sum of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour that members of a national strategic community share with regard to nuclear strategy’.⁵

Defense policy as an essence derives from a program for defending a country against its enemies.⁶

Decision making is the process of making choices by identifying a decision, gathering information, and assessing alternative resolutions.⁷

Crisis, as word and essence comes from ancient Greek. It is being used in various areas including the foreign and defense policy. Charles Hermann accepts the existence of a crisis, if- and only if- it threatens one or more important goals of a state, allows only a short time for decision before the situation is significantly transformed and occurs as a surprise to the policy makers (Hermann 1972, 187). In addition to this Hermann notes that, not all incidents, defined as foreign policy crises, actually conform to this definition. Also scholars such as Brecher and Wilkenfeld (2003), Lehman (2011), George (1991) and Williams (1976) all deal with the question of classifying the crises and the states’ crisis management styles⁸ (political and strategic culture).

Crisis management is the application of strategies designed to help an organization deal with a sudden and significant negative event.⁹

2.2. The Nature and the Ubiquity of Crisis Response

Firstly, it is safe to say that crisis management nowadays is part of public policy. Especially in this day and age, when news goes viral almost instantly, organizations need to be ready to respond to any crisis quickly and efficiently, using all the available platforms (Forbes, 2017). By definition, crises involve situations where national, organizational, and personal values are at stake. In particular, crisis is a threat to basic values, with a simultaneous or subsequent awareness of a finite time for response, and of the high probability of involvement in military hostilities (Stern: 2003). What is more, the

¹<http://www.e-ir.info/2017/01/09/international-relations-theory/>

²<http://www.popularsocialscience.com/2013/11/06/neorealism-in-international-relations-kenneth-waltz/>

³<https://classroom.synonym.com/the-three-levels-of-analysis-in-international-relations-12081975.html>

⁴https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137431912_6

⁵www.lse.ac.uk/internationalRelations/.../Margaras.doc

⁶<https://www.thefreedictionary.com/defence+policy>

⁷<https://www.umassd.edu/fycm/decisionmaking/process/>

⁸<https://ecpr.eu/Events/PanelDetails.aspx?EventID=14&PanelID=3444>

⁹<http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/crisis-management>

essence (crisis) itself provokes and underlines a kind of non – stability of the political and social life. As Ch. F. Hermann (1972) says ‘A crisis is a situation that threatens the high priority goals of the decision-making unit, resists the amount of time available for response before the decision is transformed, and surprises the members of the decision making unit by its occurrence’. If someone tries to give a definition to the meaning and context of crisis, he must have two different approaches in mind. The first is the libertarian, according to which crisis is a product of escalation and turbulence of reality facts. At the heart of this thinking lies the perception that crisis situations put national interest in danger and therefore state-mechanisms must be ready to handle these phenomena. According to the second one, which is more socialistic, our world is under the state of globalization. For this reason, according to Habermas (1962), there is a differentiation of the four spheres in social practicing. More than ever, Economy, Politics, Culture and Society have become more autonomous and independent from each other. In that sense, crisis emerges from the attempt of one sphere to invade the other.

Mainly, crisis management literature provides a variety of methods and approaches, with scientists being significant supporters of a great number of analytical assumptions. According to this approach, the crisis’ circle or vector is divided into different phases, each with its own characteristics. The conflict cycle/vector is an ‘ideal type’ (such as Max Weber had proposed) and can also be viewed as a tool for crisis management, resolution and prevention. It contains:

- Potential Crisis: this phase is characterized by the presence of the underlying conditions or mobilizing factors that lead to a crisis emerging.
- Gestation of Crisis: this phase is characterized by some actors being mobilized towards conflict and by the occurrence of low-intensity repression.
- Mobilization of Crisis: this phase – often referred to as the ‘trigger phase’ – is characterized by a high degree of tension and confrontation between the opponent parties.
- Post-Crisis: in this phase nothing is stable, while the constant possibility of the crisis is reemerging.

In relevance with the above stated assumptions Alexander George’s ‘operational code’ remains a unique methodological tool in this approach. In accordance with this, “leadership psychology” refers to the varied psychological elements and assumptions that every leader brings to the decision process (J. Renshon S. A. Renshon: 2008). Political rationality - although the courage, skills, and dedication of military, diplomatic and political personnel are a crucial factor - refers to the decision – making process.

In this context, decision-making and crisis management process mean the set of rules and methods used by the participants in the decision-making structure for a particular choice or preference choices certain to solve a particular problem (A. A Kafarneh: 2013). Thus decision making is an ambiguous area, pending political rationality and productivity for national interests and State-values. Therefore, decision is an essential key for public policy matters and therefore poor decision-making may have various costs for State-interests.

What is more, civilian/ governmental control of the military and foreign affairs handling are sine qua non preconditions for democracies and therefore, it is absolutely imperative that both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense get the right information, the right structures, the right processes, and the right people to make the best decisions. Also in policy making we must not forget that decision structure refers to the ways in which an executive organizes the decision-making process and involves institutional frameworks and procedures, as well as the dynamics that characterize the internal debating process. Decision-making bodies generally differ from country to country, and the country’s Constitution determines which is responsible for foreign policy decision – making. There are also several sub bodies within the state involved in the decision-making process in foreign policy, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense and other institutional actors. Of course the structural and institutional approach needs a necessary cognitive ‘filling’. Organizational culture and behavior give decision makers in foreign politics the tools with which they can explain the reality in their perspectives, and with their principles and endeavor, to access to authority to achieve these principles and evaluations, through decision which is taken in the name of the system. Greek administration reflects on clearer accountability on decision-making, and reinforced civilian control,

but it has not addressed a reflexive and grand strategic thought, especially on military and diplomatic crisis management issues. In some cases the structure of decision-making was bewildering. Particularly, there is a different point of view among all the political, diplomatic and military actors. Politicians claimed that they were not aware of being in the chain of command, and some of them, as well as diplomats, seemed uncomfortable challenging military advice. On the other hand, we can see an *ex natura* lack of political and diplomatic view in many military officers. Mainly, research provides evidence that there was little sense of any long-term strategy underpinning the decisions. All this and especially the lack of mutual understanding and post - language between the political, diplomatic and military personnel seems to have created a system which struggled to establish and prioritize their objectives, evaluate alternatives, or manage the risks of a decision (as we see, following Graham Allison's approach).

What is more the logic of strategic culture resides in the central belief that collective ideas and values about the use of force are important constitutive factors in the design and execution of states' security policies.

For this reason this research seeks to address among other things the lack of Grand and long-term Strategy, and the absence of clear productivity in political decision – making. It offers new structures, which will enable all the main (political, diplomatic and military) actors to focus more on the administration of their budgets and arms, coordinate them through a joint-forces command, and leave the responsibility for strategy increasingly to the Chief of the Defense Staff (according to Greek 'Strategic Doctrine'). To be more specific -as a structural reform- this research seeks to address the foundation of Greek National Security Council (direct to the Cabinet), in combination with the building of Strategic Planning and Analysis Units at the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs and also at the National Staff. This pyramidal organizational structure is crucial in order to provide a formal setting, and facilitate a post – bureaucratic and interdepartmental coordination on strategy. In this way we might avoid the situation in which the most senior members of the cabinet and diplomatic service, several times, were kept--- informed--- of defense and security issues, and the Prime Minister was in a position to make the ultimate decisions. There is a need to build a new legal environment with an evolving arms strategy, at a time when the public often appears skeptical of using the military. According to these post-changes and threats there is a need for new presumptions and beliefs: a new international theorem. Precisely, this research provides a new cognitive framework having the above stated necessary institutional building and reflexive point of view. This new vision derives from an anaclastic vision of international relation theory. Under this context we can suggest a multidisciplinary study (Canestaro: 2006) and synthesis (following Aristotle and the Pythagoreans' 'table/ theory of opposites') of two competing theories of states' motives and behavior in international relations, neorealism and constructivism.

In essence, crisis management is the application of strategies designed to help an organization deal with a sudden and significant negative event (Rouse, 2013). Consequently, planning and execution are considered the main stages of the crisis management process. According to the former, the crisis management unit displays its preparation readiness. This is a synthesis of a) establishing a framework of authority, b) setting up links among decision making centers, c) creating a group for crisis information, d) imposing the rules, e) simulating practice. In this direction, appeasement derives from the need to make structural changes in the state structures, law and procedures, and informing the public opinion. Also prevention includes the anticipation of the potential crisis, the permanent actualizing of the information regarding potential crisis areas, analyzing objective information on evolutions that can lead to crisis and the corrective intervention during the pre-crisis phase. As far as the second stage is concerned, response process demands to a) control the situation, b) overcome the initial shock, c) avoid rash and thoughtless decisions, d) activate networks, groups and experts for crisis information, e) formulate a core-position, f) elaborate an action plan, g) mobilize the decision makers.

As Tudor (2004) shows, normalization and decision-making process are fundamental parameters in the crisis management vector. They refer to crisis solving which is relevant to the need of administrating the system. It is also relevant to the coordination of public information (media and public sphere) and essentially to the appropriate use of experts and crisis managers. Finally, normalization and decision – making process refer to the reversion of normal status. This combines both managing and controlling the situation till the end of the crisis.

There is no clear-cut answer to the question of what could be done against crisis situations in foreign and defense policy. For this reason, the main areas of activities, both in crisis situations and in national interest areas should be acknowledged. That is:

- Readiness of the personnel and means of crisis management
- Elaboration of the available scientific information for the mobilization of resources in case of crisis
- Coordination of response and recovery actions in emergencies
- Coordination of emergency planning actions at national and European (or ideally at UN) level
- Provision of scientific support to the programs, plans and actions in the field of crisis management
- Monitoring and control of planning implementation at regional and local level in cooperation with competent authorities
- Proposing the distribution of state funds for national interest to the local authorities
- Preparation of special reports for every major crisis. Revisions, amendment and improvement of existing proposals are included
- Functioning of Crisis Management Operation Centers
- Operation of a unit for the assessment of information on crisis forecasting and other precursory phenomena related with uncertainty, for the early notification and warning of the competent authorities and the general public.

According to these crisis management prerequisites and national interest goals, the key-issue is to redesign the requirements in order for a state to be geared for crises situations and similar circumstances. The constraints on predictability, the ubiquity of uncertainty and the growing domains of inconceivability are imposing strict limits to the ambitions of planning and dictating some of its principal features. Under these circumstances, trying to go deeper means handling turbulent environments. This involves some combination of strategies, estimation of crisis steps and performance, all of them demanding redesigning crisis management. That is, a kind of anticipatory adjustment which can predict how the environment is changing and can provide measures in advance to cope with new situations, including seizing novel opportunities.

These are some of the aspects through which we shall analyze potential problems and issues. Before a crisis strikes, states, organizations or actors should think how a crucial situation would impact citizens, the general public and their country's values. A crisis can strike any state company at any time, and anywhere. Advanced planning is the key to survival. Therefore, the senior figures of a state should (Condit, 2014):

- Have a plan based on clear objectives (this written plan should include specific actions that will be taken in the event of a crisis).
- Identify a spokesperson to answer media questions and participate in interviews.
- Be honest and open under the state transparency and accountability.
- Keep citizens informed by giving them the 'necessary' direction.
- Communicate with the main actors and states with clear and profound strategy.
- Update early and often with emphasis on social media. 'Remember that with today's social media and cable news outlets, we live in a time of the 24/7 news cycle. Your crisis plan must do the same' (ibid, 2014).
- Another critical component of crisis management planning is the establishment of a succession plan, if suddenly the initial plan proves to be insufficient (ibid., 2014).

In respect to the Greek crisis management's mechanism the aforesaid prerequisites were miscalculated due to a variety of reasons, as we will examine afterwards. Yet, we should first turn to a historical 'hologram' of the Greek foreign and defence policy issues.

3. THE INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION

3.1. EU and UN Role in Foreign Policy and Crisis Management

The institutionalization of the EU Foreign Policy and international role has a fundamental role in the crisis management field, regarding the international and national aspect. Glencross (2014) states that 'The EU is a growing presence in international politics, undertaking civilian and military operations, promoting values such as human rights and democracy, as well as being the world's largest aid donor'. Therefore, there is a need to explore the institutional organization of the EU foreign policy. Coordination is very difficult within the EU due to the fact that it goes beyond the Ordinary Legislative Procedure (OLP). As a result, cooperation within the EU in this policy field requires a delicate balancing act. As we can see in the EU process regarding foreign policy matters, there is an open question on how far the CFSP commitment to multilateralism, international law, and human rights mark a departure from the pursuit of power or national interests. Conversation about the nature of the EU as a hard or soft power is a burning issue. In contrast to supranational developments in economic coordination, foreign and security policy lies on a different level of success. Nevertheless, EU foreign policy institutionalization has achieved a good score. The creation of the high representative for Foreign Affairs and Security, the External Action Service, and the Political and Security Committee (PSC) - is a tool to make the EU foreign policy a reality while minimizing supra-nationalism (Smith 2004). As Glencross (2014) shows, the policy-making role of the Commission and of the Parliament is thus minimized in this policy area, allowing member states to control the pace and direction of foreign policy integration. Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) are two designated 'policies' which are in accordance with institutional decision-making processes used to articulate and execute EU foreign policy. As we can see in article 21 (TEU), behind the CFSP lies the ambition to establish 'a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations' so as:

- to safeguard the EU's values, fundamental interests, security, independence, and integrity,
- consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and the principles of international law,
- preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter,
- promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance.

In order to make this happen, Article 24 (TEU) specifies that member states 'shall support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and shall comply with the Union's action in this area ...'. Furthermore, there is a provision to equip the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States (Article 42 TEU). These tasks are known as the Petersburg tasks and relate more concretely to 'joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilization' (Article 43 TEU).

Crisis management synergy between EU and UN derives from the UN's need for peace-keeping and civilian operations, and for this reason the EU is committed to developing its capacities in this field by pooling national military resources. Also we have to mention that one important CFSP goal is to move toward a more integrated EU-wide market for defense research and procurement, and therefore the European Defense Agency (EDA) was established to achieve savings in this area through economies of scale. Since the Lisbon Treaty came into force, the EU structural system contains the president of the European Council, who has the authority to call extraordinary meetings of the European Council in crisis, and moreover, the high representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Also in this conversation we must always have in mind the Transatlantic dimension, according to which the USA dominance, is seen and widely diffused by the EU system and attitude. Under this condition or necessity most EU countries (22 out of 28) are also NATO members, which entail military

coordination and participation in missions outside the EU framework. Inevitably, the EU member states not only have an alternative vehicle for military operations, but also have to balance the US and European preferences in security and foreign policy, not only *'de facto'* but also *'de iure'*. In the face of the Lisbon Treaty we clearly see that the development of CSDP 'shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defense realized in NATO ... and be compatible with the common security and defense policy established within that framework' (Art. 42.2). As Glencross shows, NATO remains an important framework for European security precisely because of worries about EU effectiveness in terms of whether the EU has the capabilities and will to act. These fears go to the heart of a fundamental debate over missing elements in EU effectiveness: the 'capability-expectations gap' (Hill 1993).

In the EU institutional framework or system there are many forces that make the difference. In international theory these forces are being assumed as intergovernmental or supranational explanatories. Institutionalization of foreign policy continued with the Lisbon Treaty and the following provisions. Nevertheless, 'CFSP and NATO are formally [and artificially] intended to be compatible, the former being generally based on soft power while hard power is used only for humanitarian or peace-keeping missions'.

To sum up the EU capacity in crisis management depends on the relationship with both NATO and the USA. And this *sine qua non* assumption has inevitable conjunctions and implications to the member states' national strategy. Greece has to solve this geopolitical (and not only) conundrum in foreign and defense policy. Not as fatal Sisyphus but as reflexive Prometheus.

4. CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN GREECE

4.1. Greece's Foreign and Defense Issues¹⁰

For the Hellenic Republic, decision-making in foreign and defense policy is a demanding point, due to the geopolitical and geostrategic position of this European country in the area of the Middle East. The Hellenic Republic confronts a series of contingencies judged as high preventive priorities for policymakers, such as the fundamental dispute with Turkey and the intensification of the civil war in Syria resulting from increased external support by warring parties, including military intervention by outside powers. What is more we also see political instability in EU countries stemming from the influx of refugees and migrants, with heightened civil unrest, isolated terrorist attacks, or violence against refugees and migrants (M. Zenko: 2015). According to the analytic point of view, foreign and defence policy – crisis management are the main domains of a state's resilience to international or interstate provocations, due to the fact that the study of international relations has understandably focused on patterns of conflict and cooperation.

It is also known that a number of scholars came to the conclusion that each country has its own way to interpret, analyse and react to international events. This brought the question of a state/national

¹⁰ Greek Ministry of Foreign: Affairs Issues of Greek - Turkish Relations(2018): in the early 1970s, Turkey initiated a systematic policy of contentions and claims against the sovereignty, the sovereign rights and jurisdictions of Greece...The goal of this newly formed policy against Greece has been the changing of the territorial *status quo* provided for in international treaties – the Treaty of Lausanne being pivotal among these – and the legal status of maritime zones and airspace as they derive from international law and the law of the sea. Starting with the dispute over the delimitation of the continental shelf (1973) and the crisis that followed – bringing the two countries into intense disagreement, which was taken in hand, on Greece's initiative, by both the UN Security Council and the International Court in the Hague – Turkey started to implement the policy of constantly increasing contentions and claims, including: contesting Greece's legal right, on threat of war (*casus belli*), to extend its territorial sea to 12 nautical miles, as provided for by the Law of the Sea, and as has been done by virtually all coastal states in the international community, including Turkey (in the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean); disputing the extent of Greek national airspace, through constant violations by Turkish fighter aircraft; contesting Greek regime and sovereignty over islands and violation of that sovereignty; disputing the delimitation of territorial sea; disputing responsibilities within the Athina FIR, which were entrusted to Greece by ICAO, and constant refusal on the part of Turkey to comply with air traffic regulations; disputing Greece's jurisdiction within the search and rescue region under Greek responsibility; demanding the demilitarization of the islands of the Eastern Aegean. ... Greece stresses the need to respect International Law (in particular the International Law of the Sea) as well as the importance of the principle of good neighbourly relations – an essential European common value.

culture back to the agenda and created a new wave of literature which focused on the development of a new tool of analysis, notably that of strategic culture. According to Longhurst (2000), strategic culture today can be best defined as ‘a distinctive body of beliefs, attitudes and practices regarding the use of force, which are held by a collective and arise gradually over time, through a unique protracted historical process. A strategic culture is persistent over time, tending to outlast the era of its original inception, although it is not a permanent or static feature. It is shaped and influenced by formative periods and can alter, either fundamentally or piecemeal, at critical junctures in that collective’s experiences’ (Margaras 2004).

In this context, this research examines decision - making and crisis management in foreign and defence policy according to the following methodological framework: there are three features of academic debate that are identified: the interdisciplinary - inter-ministerial and fused inter-governmental relationship nature of decision making in these fields of policy (and crisis management), centralized leadership in constitutional framework, and lack of analysis structures.

Beliefs, feelings, fears, aims and ambitions are the unobservable aspects of each strategic culture. They are the core values that form the foundational elements of it, giving it its quality and characteristics. These foundational elements are derived directly from formative experiences and have been internalised, creating a fairly consensual or centripetal nature to the strategic culture. Importantly, whether these experiences were actually lived through or not by all individuals in a given collective are points of common reference and remembrance. These elements form the nations’ strategic culture. As a result, practices and policies are direct outcomes of these foundational elements. It is also argued that strategic culture produces tendencies and influences but does not always determine behaviour because sometimes other external factors act as obstacle to state preferences (Margaras).

4.2. Greece’s National Crisis Management Framework

In accordance with the Greek Constitution –regarding crisis management institutions- we can see that:

- Greece, adhering to the generally recognized rules of international law, pursues the strengthening of peace and of justice, and the fostering of friendly relations between peoples and States (Article 2, paragraph 2).
- No change in the boundaries of the Country can be made without a statute passed by an absolute majority of the total number of Members of Parliament.
- Foreign military forces are not acceptable on Greek territory, nor may they remain in or traverse it, except as provided by law passed by an absolute majority of the total number of Members of Parliament (Article 27, paragraphs 1,2).
- The generally recognized rules of international law, as well as international conventions as of the time they are ratified by statute and become operative according to their respective conditions, shall be an integral part of domestic Greek law and shall prevail over any contrary provision of the law. The rules of international law and of international conventions shall be applicable to aliens only under the condition of reciprocity.
- Authorities provided by the Constitution may by treaty or agreement be vested in agencies of international organizations, when this serves an important national interest and promotes cooperation with other States. A majority of three-fifths of the total number of Members of Parliament shall be necessary to vote the law ratifying the treaty or agreement.
- Greece shall freely proceed by law passed by an absolute majority of the total number of Members of Parliament to limit the exercise of national sovereignty, insofar as this is dictated by an important national interest, does not infringe upon the rights of man and the foundations of democratic government and is effected on the basis of the principles of equality and under the condition of reciprocity (Article 28, paragraphs 1,2,3).
- The Cabinet, which shall be composed of the Prime Minister and the Ministers, constitutes the Government. The composition and functioning of the Cabinet shall be specified by law. One or more Ministers may be appointed Vice Presidents of the Cabinet, by decree initiated by the Prime Minister. A statute shall regulate the status of Deputy Ministers, Ministers

without portfolio and Undersecretaries who may be members of the Cabinet, as well as the status of permanent Undersecretaries (Article 81, paragraph 1).

- The Government shall define and direct the general policy of the Country, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and the laws.
- The Prime Minister shall safeguard the unity of the Government and shall direct the actions of the Government and of the public services in general, for the implementation of Government policy within the framework of the laws.
- ** Matters relating to the establishment, functioning and competences of the National Council of Foreign Policy, with the participation of representatives from the parties in Parliament and of persons possessing expertise or specialized experience, shall be specified by law (Article 82, paragraphs 1,2,4).

In the Greek machinery of governance crisis management (and national security) structures, we can also see the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which conducts the foreign policy and primarily safeguards the rights and interests of the Greek State and implements international conventions and international law. More specifically, we have to mention the Crisis Management Unit which, according to its nature, provides assistance in emergency situations (especially in natural disasters). 'This Unit operates under the supervision of the Secretary General as the coordinating body amongst services at the Foreign Ministry and other Ministries when emergency situations of a humanitarian or consular nature arise. In emergencies, the Unit is put into 24-hour operation, providing the necessary organizational support for the Ministry services involved in confronting a given emergency'. On the other hand, Greek National defense includes or concludes the following structures:

- The Permanent Committee of National Defense and Foreign Affairs of the Parliament, as the parliamentary view in defense matters.
- The Governmental Council on Foreign Policy and National Defense (KYSEA, in Greek language), which is the decisive institution regarding national defense issues, and especially crisis management.
- Ministry of Defense (which accomplishes the national military strategy and controlling the Armed Forces).

Under this context we can support that there is not only an institutional gap among the whole function of defence and foreign policy, but also a content gap. Therefore, there is the necessity to go beyond the obvious functions and ways of thought.

4.3. Case Study: The Crisis Incident of Imia (1996)

Imia is a rock island in the Aegean Sea, to which Turks and Greeks send forces in order to preserve their occupation. Turks defied the treaties and claimed that the *status quo* in the area is questionable. The two countries were almost in a state of war and this fact showed that in crisis situations in foreign policy where one country confronts another, the role of hegemonic mediation is fundamental. In the case of Imia there was no mediation from the European Community or other countries and the UN Organization was weak to intervene and we saw the 'dominant mediation' of USA.

According to the Greek administrative point of view, the system was unable to coordinate and have a full picture of the whole event. There was no cooperation between the political and military sides and coherence of orders. Crisis management units failed to solve this incident sufficiently. Undoubtedly we saw a different point of view among all the actors involved. Politicians claimed that there were not aware of being in the chain of command, and some of them, as well as diplomats, seemed uncomfortable challenging military advice. On the other hand, we saw an *ex natura* lack of political and diplomatic view in many military officers. Mainly, research provides the evidence that there was little sense of any long-term strategy underpinning the decisions. For this reason we have to give emphasis again on the lack of mutual understanding and post - language between the political, diplomatic and military personnel. This pathogen seems to have created a system which struggled to establish and prioritize their objectives, evaluate alternatives, or manage the risks of a decision (as we see, following the Graham Allison's approach and the following models: i. Rational Policy Model (Model I), ii. Organizational Process Model (Model II), iii. a Bureaucratic Politics Model (Model III).

Imia crisis makes clearer all the structural and process weaknesses and the lack of Grand Strategy. Therefore, as strategy or tactic move all the Greek Governments are working for the normalization of Greek-Turkish relations in the belief that this will prove to be in the interest of both peoples. 'Greece support 'Turkey's European perspective, without territorial claims and violations, with respect for International Law and human rights; and, of course, with the solution of the Cyprus problem'. But Turkey still is a 'crabby' neighbor.

5. THE ANALYTICAL CONTOUR

5.1. The Necessity of Strategic Analysis. Structures and Mechanisms of National Security and Strategic Planning. A 'Feature Model' of High- Quality Crisis Management

Crisis is endemic in public policy and in political system, as we can see in every analytical instrument and philosophical approach or political ideology. Among other administrative and strategic parameters which should be kept in mind (especially after the crisis incident of Imia) this article proposes the establishment of a National Security Council. Despite a variety of constitutional and social obstacles in the Greek case this resolution will operate as an advisory instrument in government's disposal. Greek National Security Council in combination with post- bureaucratic strategic planning units will make recommendations, planning alternatives, estimations and coordinate all units. Together with the Council of Foreign Policy it will in parallel give a stable route in Greek Foreign and Defense Policy.

But significant problems were still not addressed by this new structural change: we are all spectators of the continuing lack of subject expertise, and therefore, of high-quality information or evidence available to the decision-makers. More needs to be done to educate the key decision-makers better, and train them to think and act more strategically (see Dror: 2001 and UK, House of Commons, Defense Committee: 2014-15). For this reason, this research proposal deals with the capacity to govern and administrate, with emphasis on the ability to build and cognitive and institutional framework of grand strategy and crisis management. This purpose derives from the idea of politicians as professionals, weaving the future against the unstable international and interstate environment.

Postmodern complexity and the necessity of the threats which Greece (in geopolitical and geostrategic point of view) faces are extreme. So too is the complexity of the technology now required to support the political, diplomatic and military decision-making. There is need to build a new legal environment with an evolving arms strategy, at a time when the public often appears skeptical of using the military. Responding to modern crises requires, more or less, historical and cultural understanding, greater emphasis on strategic expertise, deeper efforts of analysis and lesson learning, more openness to challenge, more clarity, more imagination, and more courage (UK, House of Commons, Defense Committee: 2014-15).

Apart from these legal and administrative prerequisites and recommendations the key - point in crisis management situations is the ability of the crisis manager: his spiritual and cognitive armament to deal with these phenomena. This necessity lies on a combination of thought, technical evaluation, luck and fantasy (or gift). Beyond some aspects about the democratic accountability of leaders in crisis situations or others in the decision theory, like the principle of satisfying or the principle of optimizing, the general meaning of the bounden rationality must accompany our analysis. Due to those scientific or epistemological perceptions it is very difficult for attempts and resolutions to be compatible with common values and expectations. Therefore the crucial need is to emphasize and give a clear content to:

- Co-ordinate the crisis management actions during situations of uncertainty.
- Propose measures and programs on these circumstances.
- Co-ordinate the whole provided assistance from every part and their co-operation.
- Co-operate and ponder with all units, research programs and think- tanks.
- Collect validated information and disseminate it to the decision makers.

In order for the Greek national crisis management and security to be effective a full range of political, legal, financial and cultural instruments need to co-exist and collaborate. More and more complex national and international relationships and border causes, coupled with the predictable political and

social difficulties facing the international community, signaled that the time was ripe for Greece (see also the matter of the Olympic Games 2004) and also for the European Union to have the necessary means to deal with crisis situations and other matters of national security and to safeguard national and European interests and values throughout our life. The combination of these developments poses a double challenge:

- of improving state's ability to act, making the instruments at its disposal more flexible and adapted to the needs of crisis response; and
- of contributing to the development of new targets for national security and its crisis management and ensuring compatibility between national and European action and more over the UN and the new instruments available under common public policies for National Security.

Sine qua non purpose in this proposal is the developing of concrete targets in the four civilian areas of crisis management or four principles of public policy and administration: military personnel, rule of law, public administration and national security. Generally speaking, some major lines in order to achieve these aims through a mechanism namely are:

- Pre/identification of intervention resources.
- Training program to improve response capability.
- Assessment and coordination teams.
- Establishment of a common emergency communication system (among countries and similar units, global approach).

The need is not to replace a state's own efforts in this field, but rather, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, to support and to supplement them. Knowledge, more than ever before, is power. Because of this all of our measures must derive from a general base of thinking, a concrete map of steps, a methodological instrumentarium of guidance of all the units and managers in crisis situations. Here is the resolution according to the model of Descartes about the four methods that should be implemented:

- Rule 1: 'Never to accept anything for true which I did not clearly know to be such; that is to say, carefully to avoid precipitancy and prejudice, and to comprise nothing more in my judgment than what was presented to my mind so clearly and distinctly as to exclude all grounds of doubt.'
- Rule 2: 'To divide each of the difficulties under examination into as many parts as possible, and as might be necessary for its adequate solution.'
- Rule 3: 'To conduct my thoughts in such order that, by commencing with objects the simplest and easiest to know, I might ascend by little and little, and, as it were, step by step, to the knowledge of the more complex; assigning in thought a certain order even to those objects which in their own nature do not stand in a relation of antecedence and sequence.'
- Rule 4: 'To make enumerations so complete, and reviews so general that I might be assured that nothing was omitted.'

These principles are operating as navigators to turbulent environments. They make us and our thoughts fallible and give us the feeling and the pursuit of optimizing our attempts. In addition to these we can say that the Descartes' principles are the fundamental methodological framework and content to reconcile the opponent theories in international relations. Due to their reflexivity there are the key for a new point of view especially in crisis situations and management.

In international theory, at the heart of the debate between realism and its opponents, there was compliance with one of the central tenets of modern international law: the prohibition on the use of force. Under this reality, Canestaro's dictum about reconciling transnationalism and realism in practice is essential food for thought. This assumption derives from the belief that there is theoretical room for both, primarily because of uncertainty over the true motives that cause states to choose either compliance or non-compliance with international law. As Canestaro (2006) stated 'this is due in part

to a lack of clarity on the true motives behind state behavior, which has allowed scholars, academics and policymakers room to interpret states' actions in accordance with their own theoretical paradigms. These two doctrines can be reconciled not because their tenets are complementary—but instead because their two worlds seem to co-exist in the course of daily affairs'.

This scientific or epistemological point of view reveals the new postmodern reality and ontology. According to these post-changes and threats there is need of new presumptions and beliefs: a new international theorem. Thus we can provide a new cognitive framework called "neorealist constructivism". This new vision derives from an anaclastic vision of international relation theory. Under this context we can suggest a multidisciplinary study (Canestaro: 2006) and synthesis (following Aristotle and Pythagoreans 'table/ theory of opposites') of two competing theories of states' motives and behavior in international relations, neorealism and constructivism. In this cognitive way we might avoid the situation in which the most senior members of the cabinet and diplomatic service, several times, were kept informed of defense and security issues, and the Prime Minister/ Cabinet would be in a position to make the ultimate decisions.

In a few words the new cognitive theorem in combination with the new structure (National Security Council), the level of interdepartmental coordination, clearer leadership, clearer accountability, clearer civilian control, and clearer opportunity for challenge, were all substantial improvements on the old and classic (or obsolete) decision-making systems.

6. CONCLUSION: PREPARING FOR CRISES: CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS

Crisis management will be a topic of great concern to the international society, due to the fact that crisis is synonym to the meaning of life. The connection between them is an utmost admission for all human beings. This realization in parallel with the entropy of the things is a factor that reduces the negative context of crisis. Otherwise we might fail to a situation called 'crisis of the crisis management'. What is more we do not live in Kant's 'permanent piece' or in Hobbes 'world' ('*homo hominilupus*'). For the EU, it is important to say that the major players in the European security architecture have committed themselves in principle to highlight the emphasis on crisis management and conflict resolution.

Therefore, in crisis situations we must keep into account the uncertainty and state of flux as a vital precondition for better handling and governing. The fundamental idea is that in crisis management matters we must provoke only our mind ('nou') and not our nerves ('thymikon' in Plato words). Crisis management includes a necessary and sufficient condition: international system's equilibrium derives from the harmonization of the opposites. Similarly in international theories we have to be more reflexive in our approaches combining Anaximander's philosophical point of view. According to him, our world originates in the separation of opposites such as hot and cold, wet and dry, which directs the movement of things. By putting this analogy to our minds regarding crisis management we might have not only a new political and strategic view but a prolific scientific and epistemological instrumentarium.

The Aegean dispute between Greece and Turkey is a complicated issue. Regime establishment in the Aegean Sea as a security area (under the economic realm) paves the way in which both countries will moderate their competitive policies. This perspective has a dual background: the neorealist, under the USA dominance and the pluralistic, under the power of international law (via the International Court of Justice). This path gives the possibility to overcome state-centric points of view and atavistic behaviors.

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